Abstract
We study the problem of allocating objects when monetary transfers are possible. We are interested in mechanisms that allocate the objects in an efficient way and induce the agents to report their true preferences. Within the class of such mechanisms, first we characterize egalitarian-equivalent mechanisms. Then, we add a bounded-deficit condition and characterize the corresponding class. Finally, we investigate the relations between egalitarian-equivalence and other fairness notions such as no-envy.
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The first draft of this paper was written while I was a Ph.D. student at the University of Rochester. An earlier version of this paper was titled “Fairness in Auctions and Task Assignments”.
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Yengin, D. Egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms in the allocation of heterogenous objects. Soc Choice Welf 38, 137–160 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0523-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0523-0