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A characterization of the nucleolus without homogeneity in airport problems

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Abstract

We consider the problem of sharing the cost of a public facility among agents who have different needs for the facility. We show that the nucleolus is the only rule satisfying equal treatment of equals, last-agent cost additivity, and consistency.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Applied Mathematics, National Dong Hwa University, Hua-Lien, 974, Taiwan

    Yan-An Hwang

  2. Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, 115, Taiwan

    Chun-Hsien Yeh

Authors
  1. Yan-An Hwang
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  2. Chun-Hsien Yeh
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Correspondence to Chun-Hsien Yeh.

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Hwang, YA., Yeh, CH. A characterization of the nucleolus without homogeneity in airport problems. Soc Choice Welf 38, 355–364 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0524-z

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0524-z

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