Abstract
The concept of n-scale independence is introduced for a preference relation defined on \({\mathbb{R}^{n}=\mathbb{R}^{n_{1}}\times \cdots \times \mathbb{R}^{n_{p}}}\). In addition to zero-independence and upper semicontinuity at zero, n-scale independence allows us to characterizate linear oligarchies as well as to offer a (semi)continuous welfarist analogue of Wilson’s theorem. We also include a characterization of the class of continuous, n-separable and n-scale independent, p ≥ 3, social orderings in terms of what we call homogeneous oligarchies.
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Candeal, J.C. Subgroup independence conditions on preferences. Soc Choice Welf 39, 847–853 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0558-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0558-x