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Choice procedures and power structure in social decisions

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Abstract

In contrast to a social choice function, a social choice procedure is proposed which depends both on the way a set of alternatives is broken up into the subsets and the sequence in which each of these subsets is taken up for consideration. This article investigates the Arrow question in this generalized framework.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of California, Riverside, CA, 92521, USA

    Taradas Bandyopadhyay

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  1. Taradas Bandyopadhyay
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Correspondence to Taradas Bandyopadhyay.

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Bandyopadhyay, T. Choice procedures and power structure in social decisions. Soc Choice Welf 37, 597–608 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0583-9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0583-9

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