Abstract
We show that in a pure exchange economy with two agents and a finite number of goods, there exists no strategy-proof, Pareto-efficient, and non-dictatorial social choice allocation function on any local Cobb–Douglas preference domain. This is a slight extension of a result proved by Hashimoto (2008).
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Momi, T. Note on social choice allocation in exchange economies with Cobb–Douglas preferences. Soc Choice Welf 40, 787–792 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0643-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0643-1