Abstract
In tournaments, one alternative contests another if is a “winner” among only alternatives that beat it. This paper examines the consequences and limitations of the contestation relation by considering a procedure in which alternatives that are contested are iteratively eliminated from consideration. In doing so, a new family of tournament solutions are introduced and related to existing refinements of the Banks set. Findings show that iterated removal of contested alternatives a limited device for choosing from tournaments. These results contrast with results regarding the top-set of the contestation relation. Results highlight the role of the top-set operator for choice from tournaments.
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This work benefited greatly from the comments of two anonymous reviewers as well as associate editor Prof. Laslier. Any remaining errors are, of course, mine alone. A significant portion of this work was conducted while I was a Post-doctoral Research Fellow at Nuffield College, University of Oxford, to which I am most grateful.
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Moser, S. A note on contestation-based tournament solutions. Soc Choice Welf 41, 133–143 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0672-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0672-4