Abstract
We consider the problem of assigning indivisible goods among a group of agents with lotteries when the preference profile is single-peaked. Unfortunately, even on this restricted domain of preferences, equal treatment of equals, stochastic dominance efficiency, and stochastic dominance strategy-proofness are incompatible.
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Kasajima, Y. Probabilistic assignment of indivisible goods with single-peaked preferences. Soc Choice Welf 41, 203–215 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0674-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0674-2