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Quasi-decisiveness, quasi-ultrafilter, and social quasi-orderings

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Abstract

The aim of the present paper is to provide an axiomatic analysis of incomplete social judgments. In particular, we clarify the underlying power structure of Arrovian collective choice rules when social preferences are allowed to be incomplete. We propose the concept of quasi-decisiveness and investigate the properties of the collection of quasi-decisive sets associated with an Arrovian collective choice rule. In the course of this, we offer a series of applications.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Graduate School of Social Sciences, Tokyo Metropolitan University, 1-1 Minami-Osawa, Hachioji-shi, Tokyo, 192-0397, Japan

    Susumu Cato

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  1. Susumu Cato
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Correspondence to Susumu Cato.

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Cato, S. Quasi-decisiveness, quasi-ultrafilter, and social quasi-orderings. Soc Choice Welf 41, 169–202 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0677-z

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