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Fair allocation of indivisible goods: the two-agent case

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Abstract

One must allocate a finite set of indivisible goods among two agents without monetary compensation. We impose Pareto-efficiency, anonymity, a weak notion of no-envy, a welfare lower bound based on each agent’s ranking of the subsets of goods, and a monotonicity property w.r.t. changes in preferences. We prove that there is a rule satisfying these axioms. If there are three goods, it is the only rule, together with one of its subcorrespondences, satisfying each fairness axiom and not discriminating between goods.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Chargé de Recherches du F.R.S.-FNRS, Université Catholique de Louvain, CORE, 1348, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

    Eve Ramaekers

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  1. Eve Ramaekers
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Correspondence to Eve Ramaekers.

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Ramaekers, E. Fair allocation of indivisible goods: the two-agent case. Soc Choice Welf 41, 359–380 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0684-0

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0684-0

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