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Incentive compatibility and feasibility constraints in housing markets

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Abstract

We analyze centralized housing markets under the existence of feasibility constraints on the number of agents and objects involved in the exchanges. We focus on an incomplete information setting where only the information about how each agent ranks her endowment is private. We show that under non-degenerate ex-ante probability distributions over preference profiles, no rule satisfies the joint requirements of individual rationality, (constrained) efficiency, and ordinally Bayesian incentive compatibility.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dipartamento di Scienze Economiche “Marco Fanno”, Università degli Studi di Padova, Via del Santo 33, 35123, Padua, Italy

    Antonio Nicolò

  2. Facultad CC. Económicas y Empresariales, Campus de Somosaguas, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 28223, Madrid, Spain

    Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez

Authors
  1. Antonio Nicolò
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  2. Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez
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Correspondence to Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez.

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Nicolò, A., Rodríguez-Álvarez, C. Incentive compatibility and feasibility constraints in housing markets. Soc Choice Welf 41, 625–635 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0698-7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0698-7

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