Skip to main content
Log in

Infinite-horizon social evaluation with variable population size

  • Original Paper
  • Published:
Social Choice and Welfare Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

We present an infinite-horizon extension of the framework of variable-population social choice. Our first main result is the welfarism theorem using the axiom of intratemporal anonymity. By this theorem, the ranking of social alternatives is determined by an intratemporally anonymous and finitely complete quasi-ordering [which we call social welfare relation (SWR)] defined on the set of all streams of utility vectors of generations. We introduce three SWRs: the critical-level generalized utilitarian (CLGU) SWR, the critical-level generalized overtaking (CLGO) SWR, and the critical-level generalized catching-up (CLGC) SWR. They are infinite-horizon extensions of the critical-level generalized utilitarianism. We characterize (in terms of subrelation) the CLGU SWR with five axioms: Strong Pareto, Finite Anonymity, Weak Existence of Critical Levels, Restricted Continuity, and Existence Independence. Further, the CLGO and the CLGC SWRs are characterized by adding consistency axioms. We also present infinite-horizon reformulations of some population ethics axioms. In particular, we characterize the CLGO and the CLGC SWRs associated with a positive critical level by using the axiom of avoidance of the repugnant conclusion.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. See Asheim (2010) and Lauwers (2014) for reviews of the literature.

  2. See Blackorby et al. (2002, 2005) for reviews of the literature.

  3. A variant of the critical-level leximin ordering is proposed by Blackorby et al. (1996).

  4. Boucekkine et al. (2011) apply the CLGU ordering to an endogenous growth model by using time discounting and assuming that a transformation of utility levels is the identity mapping. However, the axiomatic foundation of their evaluation relation is not discussed.

  5. The impossibility of explicit construction of Paretian and anonymous orderings for infinite utility streams was first suggested by Fleurbaey and Michel (2003).

  6. The Suppes–Sen grading principle was introduced by Suppes (1966) and further analyzed by Sen (1970) in the finite- and fixed-population framework.

  7. A characterization in terms of subrelation means a characterization of the class of all SWRs that include the SWR considered as a subrelation. The notion of subrelation is explained in Sect. 3.1.

  8. For a discussion of neutrality and its normalization to zero, see Broome (1993).

  9. A quasi-ordering is a reflexive and transitive binary relation.

  10. See also d’Aspremont (1985, 2007) and d’Aspremont and Gevers (1977) for similar results in the finite- and infinite-horizon fixed-population frameworks.

  11. See also Blackorby et al. (1995, 2002, 2005) for the critical-level generalized utilitarian ordering.

  12. Their axioms also appear in Blackorby et al. (1995, 1998a, 1999).

  13. An ordering extension of a given binary relation is an ordering that includes it as a subrelation.

  14. See also Asheim and Banerjee (2010), Asheim and Tungodden (2004), and Basu and Mitra (2007) for similar axioms in the framework of ranking infinite utility streams.

  15. An axiom similar to IC is presented by Asheim and Tungodden (2002) in the framework of ranking infinite utility streams.

  16. See also Carlson (1998) for other related criticisms.

  17. Blackorby et al. (1997, footnote 35) note that Thomas Hurka also made this point.

References

  • Arrhenius G (2011) Population Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press (fourthcoming)

  • Arrhenius G (2000) An impossibility theorem for welfarist axiologies. Econ Philos 16:247–266

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Arrow KJ (1963) Social choice and individual values, 2nd edn. Wiley, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Asheim GB (1991) Unjust intergenerational allocations. J Econ Theory 54:350–371

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Asheim GB (2010) Intergenerational equity. Annu Rev Econ 2:197–222

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Asheim GB, Banerjee K (2010) Fixed-step anonymous overtaking and catching-up. Int J Econ Theory 6:149–165

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Asheim GB, Buchholz W, Tungodden B (2001) Justifying sustainability. J Environ Econ Manage 41:252–268

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Asheim GB, d’Aspremont C, Banerjee K (2010) Generalized time-invariant overtaking. J Math Econ 46:519–533

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Asheim GB, Mitra T (2010) Sustainability and discounted utilitarianism in models of economic growth. Math Soc Sci 59:148–169

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Asheim GB, Mitra T, Tungodden B (2012) Sustainable recursive social welfare functions. Econ Theory 49:267–292

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Asheim GB, Tungodden B (2002) Resolving distributional conflict between generations. University of Oslo, Mimeo

    Google Scholar 

  • Asheim GB, Tungodden B (2004) Resolving distributional conflict between generations. Econ Theory 24:221–230

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Asheim GB, Zuber S (2014) Escaping the repugnant conclusion: rank-discounted utilitarianism with variable population. Theoret Econ 9:629–650

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Atsumi H (1965) Neoclassical growth and the efficient program of capital accumulation. Rev Econ Stud 32:127–136

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Basu K, Mitra T (2007) Utilitarianism for infinite utility streams: a new welfare criterion and its axiomatic characterization. J Econ Theory 133:350–373

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Blackorby C, Bossert W, Donaldson D (1995) Intertemporal population ethics: critical-level utilitarian principles. Econometrica 63:5–10

    Google Scholar 

  • Blackorby C, Bossert W, Donaldson D (1996) Leximin population ethics. Math Soc Sci 31:115–131

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Blackorby C, Bossert W, Donaldson D (1997) Critical-level utilitarianism and the population-ethics dilemma. Econ Philos 13:197–230

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Blackorby C, Bossert W, Donaldson D (1998a) Uncertainty and critical-level population principles. J Popul Econ 11:1–20

  • Blackorby C, Bossert W, Donaldson D (1999) Information invariance in variable population social-choice problems. Int Econ Rev 40:403–422

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Blackorby C, Bossert W, Donaldson D (2002) Utilitarianism and the theory of justice. In: Arrow KJ, Sen AK, Suzumura K (eds) Handbook of social choice and welfare, vol I. North-Holland, Amsterdam, pp 543–596

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Blackorby C, Bossert W, Donaldson D (2005) Population issues in social choice theory, welfare economics, and ethics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Blackorby C, Bossert W, Donaldson D, Fleurbaey M (1998b) Critical levels and the (reverse) repugnant conclusion. J Econ 67:1–15

  • Blackorby C, Donaldson D (1984) Social criteria for evaluating population change. J Pub Econ 25:13–33

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boucekkine R, Fabbri G (2013) Assessing Parfit’s repugnant conclusion within a canonical endogenous growth set-up. J Popul Econ 26:751–767

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boucekkine R, Fabbri G, Gozzi F (2011) Revisiting the optimal population size problem under endogenous growth: minimal utility level and finite life. Asia-Pac J Account Econ 18:287–305

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boucekkine R, Fabbri G, Gozzi F (2014) Egalitarianism under population change: age structure does matter. J Math Econ 55:86–100

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Broome J (1992) The value of living. Rech Econ Louvain 58:125–142

    Google Scholar 

  • Broome J (1993) Goodness is reducible to betterness: the evil of death is the value of life. In: Koslowski P, Shionoya Y (eds) The good and the economical: ethical choices in economics and management. Springer, Berline, pp 69–83

    Google Scholar 

  • Carlson E (1998) Mere addition and two trilemmas of population ethics. Econ Philos 14:283–306

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • d’Aspremont C (1985) Axioms for social welfare orderings. In: Harwicz L, Schmeidler D, Sonnenschein H (eds) Social goals and social organization: essays in memory of Elisha Pazner. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 19–76

    Google Scholar 

  • d’Aspremont C (2007) Formal welfarism and intergenerational equity. In: Roemer J, Suzumura K (eds) Intergenerational equity and sustainability. Palgrave, London, pp 113–130

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • d’Aspremont C, Gevers L (1977) Equity and the informational basis of collective choice. Rev Econ Stud 44:199–209

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Diamond P (1965) The evaluation of infinite utility streams. Econometrica 33:170–177

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dubey RS (2011) Fleurbaey-Michel conjecture on equitable weak Paretian social welfare order. J Math Econ 47:434–439

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fleurbaey M, Michel P (2003) Intertemporal equity and the extension of the Ramsey criterion. J Math Econ 39:777–802

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kamaga K (2016) Infinite-horizon social evaluation with variable population size. Sophia University, Mimeo

    Google Scholar 

  • Kamaga K, Kojima T (2010) On the leximin and utilitarian overtaking criteria with extended anonymity. Soc Choice Welf 35:377–392

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Koopmans TC (1960) Stationary ordinal utility and impatience. Econometrica 28:287–309

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lauwers L (2010) Ordering infinite utility streams comes at the cost of a non-Ramsey set. J Math Econ 46:32–37

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lauwers L (2014) The axiomatic approach to the ranking of infinite streams. Discussion Paper Series, 14.07, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven

  • Palivos T, Yip CK (1993) Optimal population size and endogenous growth. Econ Lett 41:107–110

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Parfit D (1976) On doing the best for our children. In: Bayles M (ed) Ethics and population. Shenkman, Cambridge, pp 100–102

    Google Scholar 

  • Parfit D (1982) Future generations, further problems. Philos Public Aff 11:113–172

    Google Scholar 

  • Parfit D (1984) Reasons and persons. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Razin A, Yuen CW (1995) Utilitarian tradeoff between population growth and income growth. J Popul Econ 8:81–87

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sen AK (1970) Collective choice and social welfare. Holden-Day, Amsterdam

    Google Scholar 

  • Suppes P (1966) Some formal models of grading principles. Synthese 6:284–306

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Svensson LG (1980) Equity among generations. Econometrica 48:1251–1256

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Szpilrajn E (1930) Sur l’extension de l’ordre partiel. Fundam Math 16:386–389

    Google Scholar 

  • von Weizsäcker CC (1965) Existence of optimal programs of accumulation for an infinite time horizon. Rev Econ Stud 32:85–104

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zame W (2007) Can intergenerational equity be operationalized? Theoret Econ 2:187–202

    Google Scholar 

  • Zuber S, Asheim GB (2012) Justifying social discounting: the rank-discounted utilitarian approach. J Econ Theory 147:1572–1601

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to two anonymous referees and an editor of this journal. Their detailed comments and suggestions have greatly improved the current version of this paper. I also thank the participants at the 11th Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare for their comments. All remaining errors are my own. This study is partly supported by a Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B) (No. 23730196) from the Ministry of Education, Science, Sports, and Culture, Japan.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Kohei Kamaga.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Kamaga, K. Infinite-horizon social evaluation with variable population size. Soc Choice Welf 47, 207–232 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0953-4

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0953-4

Navigation