Abstract
We say that an alternative is socially acceptable if the number of individuals that rank it among their most preferred half of the alternatives is at least as large as the number of individuals that rank it among the least preferred half. We show that there exists a unique scoring rule that always selects a subset of socially acceptable alternatives.
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We thank two anonymous referees for their helpful comments.
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Mahajne, M., Volij, O. The socially acceptable scoring rule. Soc Choice Welf 51, 223–233 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-018-1113-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-018-1113-9