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Individual preferences and democratic processes: two theorems with implications for electoral politics

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Abstract

The paper provides a complete characterization of Nash equilibria for games in which n candidates choose a strategy in the form of a platform, each from a circle of feasible platforms, with the aim of maximizing the stretch of the circle from where the candidate’s platform will receive support from the voters. Using this characterization, it is shown that if the sum of all players’ payoffs is 1,  the Nash equilibrium payoff of each player in an arbitrary Nash equilibrium must be restricted to the interval \( [1/2(n-1),2/(n+1)].\) This implies that in an election with four candidates, a candidate who is attracting less than one-sixth of the voters can do better by changing his or her strategy.

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Notes

  1. Similar issues of cluster and spread arise in the literature on spatial location and agglomeration (Fujita and Thisse 1996; Pal 1998; Matsushima 2001).

  2. Alternatively, we could think of the circle as a rotary along which people in a town live. The only way to travel in this town is along the rotary (in any direction). Two retail vendors, selling goods which have exogenously fixed prices, have to set up shops at points on the rotary. If we make the reasonable assumption that customers will go to the nearest store, and each vendor is interested in maximizing the number of customers she has, then again we have a classic game theory problem. Similar arguments apply to brand proliferation (see d’Aspremont et al. 1979; Schmalensee 1978; Salop 1979; Basu 1993; Gabszewicz et al. 1986; Brander and Spencer 2015).

  3. A voter whose ideal is on an inner concentric circle might feel perfectly aligned with the platform of the corresponding radial point on the unit circle (closest to it). The view might be that the two platforms differ only in “intensity” of preference on the two issues, but not in “direction”. In this case, we recover precisely the model with only the unit circle as the space of voter ideals.

  4. For an extensive discussion of, and empirical evidence on, this issue, see Stokes (1963, pp. 370–371).

  5. The list of important issues can of course change over time. So, the same “fixed structure” [to use the terminology of Stokes (1963)] might not be applicable at different points in time (political eras).

  6. This is not an innocent supposition. Stokes (1963, p. 370) notes: “What is more, when our respondents are asked directly to describe the parties in terms of the liberal-conservative distinction, nearly half confess that the terms are unfamiliar. And the bizarre meanings given the terms by many of those who do attempt to use them suggest that we are eliciting artificial answers that have little to do with the public’s everyday perceptions of the parties.”

  7. The circle has been an object of intellectual interest from pre-Socratic and pre-Pythagorean times. It was analyzed in some depth by Thales of Miletus. Born in Miletus in Asia Minor (currently Turkey), in 624 BC, he was 54 years senior to Pythagoras, and is often regarded as the first “Greek philosopher” that proved some theorems concerning right-angled triangles and the circle, using pure deductive reasoning. In that tradition, quite apart from its implications for electoral politics and location economics, this paper may be viewed as an exercise in pure abstract reasoning.

  8. This circumference is specified precisely, as soon as we pick a radius of the circle, a positive real number.

  9. When the two arc lengths are not equal, the arc with the larger arc length is called the major arc, and the arc with the smaller arc length is called the minor arc.

  10. Each \(s_{i}\) can be specified precisely in terms of its Cartesian co-ordinates.

  11. Note that a neighborhood for player i can be a minor arc, and it can also be a major arc, depending on the positions of the other players on the circle.

  12. Note that the deviation can result in two players (but not more) being at the same location, since the original placement is scattered.

  13. While the claim (5) is intuitively clear, it takes a bit of work to establish this analytically. It is included in an Appendix.

  14. Claim (8) is intuitively clear, but it takes a bit of work to establish this analytically. It is included in an Appendix.

  15. It might be difficult for a candidate to change his platform significantly, given his ideological beliefs. On a more pragmatic note, significant changes in platform by a candidate to suit an election might not be taken seriously by voters, who might rightly view it as an opportunistic move. In such cases, (1 / 6) would also be a useful benchmark to decide whether to quit a race.

  16. Each \(s_{i}\) can be specified precisely in terms of its Cartesian co-ordinates.

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Correspondence to Kaushik Basu.

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We would like to express our indebtedness to Tito Cordella, Avinash Dixit, Anderson Ospino, Arunava Sen, Kotaro Suzumura and two referees of this journal for comments on an earlier version of this paper.

Appendix

Appendix

1.1 Proof of claim (5) in Sect. 3

Since \(k\ne j,\) the definition of \(s^{\prime }\) implies that \(s_{k}^{\prime }=s_{k}\in Y_{k}(s).\) If there is some \(s_{r}^{\prime }\) in \(Y_{k}(s)\) with \( s_{r}^{\prime }\ne s_{k}^{\prime },\) then \(r\ne k,j,\) and so by definition of \(s^{\prime },\)\(s_{r}^{\prime }=s_{r}\) must hold. In this case, we have \( s_{r}\) in \(Y_{k}(s)\) with \(s_{r}\ne s_{k},\) a contradiction to the definition of \(Y_{k}(s).\) This establishes that there is no \(s_{r}^{\prime }\) in \(Y_{k}(s)\) with \(s_{r}^{\prime }\ne s_{k}^{\prime }.\) Since \(Y_{k}(s)\) is a connected set containing \(s_{k}^{\prime },\) and there is no \( s_{r}^{\prime }\) in \(Y_{k}(s)\) with \(s_{r}^{\prime }\ne s_{k}^{\prime },\) we must have \(Y_{k}(s)\subset Y_{k}(s^{\prime }),\) and consequently \({\bar{Y}} _{k}(s)\subset {\bar{Y}}_{k}(s^{\prime })\) as well.

Using (NBD), let us write \(Y_{k}(s)=arc(s_{L(k)},s_{R(k)})\equiv arc(s_{p},s_{q}).\) Note that \(s_{L(k)}\ne s_{k},\) and \(s_{R(k)}\ne s_{k},\) and \(s_{L(k)}\ne s_{R(k)}.\) Now, if \(s_{L(k)}=s_{j},\) then since \( s_{L(k)}\in {\bar{Y}}_{k}(s)\) and \(s_{j}\in Y_{j}(s),\) we would have \({\bar{Y}} _{k}(s)\cap Y_{j}(s)\ne \phi ,\) a contradiction to the definition of case (b)(I). Thus, we must have \(s_{L(k)}\ne s_{j},\) and similarly \(s_{R(k)}\ne s_{j}.\) By definition of \(s^{\prime }\) it follows that \(s_{p}^{\prime }=s_{p} \) and \(s_{q}^{\prime }=s_{q}.\)

Both \(s_{p}\) and \(s_{q}\) belong to \({\bar{Y}}_{k}(s),\) and since \({\bar{Y}} _{k}(s)\subset {\bar{Y}}_{k}(s^{\prime }),\) they belong to \({\bar{Y}} _{k}(s^{\prime }).\) However, they cannot be interior points of \({\bar{Y}} _{k}(s^{\prime });\) that is, they cannot belong to \(Y_{k}(s^{\prime }).\) To see this, note that \(s_{p}\ne s_{k},\)\(s_{p}=s_{p}^{\prime }\) and \( s_{k}=s_{k}^{\prime },\) and so \(s_{p}^{\prime }\ne s_{k}^{\prime }.\) Then, by definition of \(Y_{k}(s^{\prime }),\) we infer that \(s_{p}^{\prime }\) cannot be in \(Y_{k}(s^{\prime });\) that is, \(s_{p}\) cannot be in \( Y_{k}(s^{\prime }).\) A similar reasoning establishes that \(s_{q}\) cannot be an interior point of \({\bar{Y}}_{k}(s^{\prime }).\) Thus, both are boundary points of \({\bar{Y}}_{k}(s^{\prime }).\) This means that \({\bar{Y}}_{k}(s^{\prime })\) is either the set \(arc[s_{p},s_{q}]\) or the set \(arc[s_{q},s_{p}].\) Since \(Y_{k}(s)=arc(s_{p},s_{q}),\) and \({\bar{Y}}_{k}(s^{\prime })\) has to contain the set \({\bar{Y}}_{k}(s)=arc[s_{p},s_{q}],\) we conclude that \({\bar{Y}} _{k}(s^{\prime })\) must be the set \(arc[s_{p},s_{q}].\) Thus, \( Y_{k}(s^{\prime })\) must be the set \(arc(s_{p},s_{q}),\) and so \( Y_{k}(s)=Y_{k}(s^{\prime }).\)

1.2 Proof of claim (8) in Sect. 3

We break up our analysis into two cases: (A1) \(s_{L(j)}=s_{R(k)}\) and (A2) \( s_{L(j)}\ne s_{R(k)}.\)

Case (A1): In this case, \(s_{j}\) belongs to \( arc(s_{R(k)},s_{L(k)}]. \) If \(s_{j}\) actually belongs to \( arc(s_{R(k)},s_{L(k)}),\) then \(Y_{j}(s)=arc(s_{R(k)},s_{L(k)}),\) which is disjoint from \({\bar{Y}}_{k}(s),\) contradicting the fact that \(Y_{j}(s)\cap {\bar{Y}}_{k}(s)\ne \phi \) in subcase (b)(II). Thus, \(s_{j}=s_{L(k)},\) and so \(s_{k}=s_{R(j)},\) so that (8)(i) in claim (8) holds.

Case (A2): We subdivide our analysis into the following two possibilities (A2a) \(s_{L(j)}\in {\bar{Y}}_{k}(s),\) (A2b) \(s_{L(j)}\notin \bar{ Y}_{k}(s).\)

In subcase (A2a), \(s_{L(j)}\) must be equal to \(s_{L(k)}\) or \(s_{k}\) or \( s_{R(k)}.\) The last possibility is ruled out since in (A2) we have \( s_{L(j)}\ne s_{R(k)}.\) If \(s_{L(j)}=s_{L(k)},\) then \(s_{j}\) must be equal to \(s_{k},\) which is ruled out since s is a scattered placement (recall that \(k\ne j\) in case (b)). Thus, we must have \(s_{L(j)}=s_{k}\) and consequently \(s_{j}=s_{R(k)}.\) That is, (8)(ii) in claim (8) holds.

In subcase (A2b), \(s_{L(j)}\in \)\(arc(s_{R(k)},s_{L(k)}),\) and consequently \( s_{R(j)}\notin arc(s_{R(k)},\)\(s_{L(k)}).\) This is because if \(s_{R(j)}\in \)\(arc(s_{R(k)},s_{L(k)}),\) then \(Y_{j}(s)\) is entirely contained in \( arc(s_{R(k)},s_{L(k)}),\) which is disjoint from \({\bar{Y}}_{k}(s),\) contradicting the fact that \(Y_{j}(s)\cap {\bar{Y}}_{k}(s)\ne \phi \) in subcase (b)(II).

Since \(s_{R(j)}\notin \)\(arc(s_{R(k)},s_{L(k)}),\) we must have \(s_{R(j)}\in {\bar{Y}}_{k}(s)\equiv \)\(arc[s_{L(k)},s_{R(k)}].\) Thus, \(s_{R(j)}\) must be equal to \(s_{L(k)}\) or \(s_{k}\) or \(s_{R(k)}.\) The first possibility is ruled out since \(s_{R(j)}=s_{L(k)}\) would imply that \(Y_{j}(s)\cap {\bar{Y}} _{k}(s)=\phi ,\) a contradiction. The third possibility is ruled out because \( s_{R(j)}=s_{R(k)}\) would imply that \(s_{j}\) must be equal to \(s_{k},\) which would contradict the fact that s is a scattered placement (recall that \( k\ne j\) in case (b)). Thus, we must have \(s_{R(j)}=s_{k}\) and consequently \( s_{j}=s_{L(k)},\) so that (8)(i) in claim (8) holds.

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Basu, K., Mitra, T. Individual preferences and democratic processes: two theorems with implications for electoral politics. Soc Choice Welf 54, 259–292 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-019-01175-9

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