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Majority decision and Condorcet winners

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Notes

  1. Other than Arrow’s (1951) own analysis, the subject relates to discussions presented by Condorcet (1785), and [translated in English] de Condorcet and Tome (1847), Daunou (1803), Black (1948, 1958), Sen (1966, 1970, 2017), Inada (1969), Sen and Pattanaik (1969), Pattanaik (1971), Maskin (1995), Dasgupta and Maskin (2008), Maskin and Sen (2014, 2016), and Barbera et al. (2019), among others.

  2. See Sen (1966) and Sen and Pattanaik (1969). See also Inada (1969) and Maskin (1995), among other contributions.

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Acknowledgements

I am most grateful to Marc Fleurbaey, Eric Maskin and Kotaro Suzumura for helpful comments on an earlier version.

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Sen, A. Majority decision and Condorcet winners. Soc Choice Welf 54, 211–217 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-020-01244-4

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