Abstract
Prior to a collective binary choice, members of a group receive binary signals correlated with the better option. A larger group size may produce less accurate decisions, but expertise is everywhere beneficial. If a group accounts for correlation in signals, a relatively expert member puts an upper bound on the probability of a false belief. The bound holds for any group size and signal distribution. Furthermore, a population investing in expertise is better off cultivating a small mass of elites than adopting an egalitarian policy of education.


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Notes
Skill refinement is another form of expertise, but decisional ability is the focus here.
A number of psychological pitfalls can also beset group decision making (e.g., Bénabou 2013; Sunstein 2005). This article emphasizes the importance of expertise in a rational setting, but groupthink can devalue its function in practice. On the other hand, Charness and Sutter (2012) cite a body of experimental evidence in which groups are less susceptible to cognitive biases than individuals in games of strategy.
While Condorcet first proposed his vision for collective wisdom in 1785, Laplace offered the first mathematical proof of the hypothesis in 1812 (Ben-Yashar and Paroush 2000).
On a related question, Ahn and Oliveros (2014) show the asymptotic lack of an informational advantage for either joint or separate trials when multiple outcomes are decided. If a sequence of equilibria exists for which the optimal outcome is chosen in the limit for one trial format, such a sequence exists for the other format too.
This assumption is slightly stronger than signal uniqueness because it does not allow signals to differ by a set of measure zero.
The priors play no important role in any result, but their equality does abstract from heterogeneous initial beliefs.
Suppose the group were to choose one of two actions based on which binary state they believed more likely. If so, the imprecision in this description would be harmless.
Note that Proposition 3 does require n to be odd. As discussed in Sect. 2, allowing an even n with a coin flip tie-breaking rule only introduces extra cases without altering the main conclusion. In an asymptotically large group, the parity of n is unimportant if the chance of a tie vote converges to zero.
This result complements (Glaeser and Sunstein 2009), who present a similar conclusion with learning over a continuous, normal distribution.
This formulation of the problem abstracts from the incentive to free ride on the participation of others. Some real world settings largely solve the participation incentive, as in jury duty and other organizations with committee service requirements.
A diagnosis is not a binary decision, but for the sake of argument, consider the question of whether or not a patient has a particular disease.
Three is the minimal number of signals required to uncover the true state. To see why, consider the general case for \(n=2\) in Table 1. If \(x=y=0\), then \(P(a_2|A)=0\), a contradiction. If \(y>0\), then \(x=0\), which implies \(y=1-p\), but then \(P(a_2|A)=P(a_2 \cap a_1|A)+P(a_2 \cap b_1|A)=0+1-p<1/2,\) again a contradiction. Lastly, if \(x>0\), then \(y=0\), which implies \(x=p\), but then both signals are identical.
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Appendix
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
See Boland (1989). \(\square \)
Proof of Lemma 1
Assume (A1)–(A4). Denote the ordered elements of \({\mathbf {g}} \in {\mathbb {G}}_{\mathbf {n}}\) by \((g_1,g_2,\ldots ,g_{|{\mathbf {g}}|})\), where \(|{\mathbf {g}}| > 1\) is the cardinality of \({\mathbf {g}}\). Let \(\alpha _i = a_{g_i}\) and \(\beta _i = b_{g_i}\) for \(i \in \{1,\ldots ,|{\mathbf {g}}|\}\). Define \(\delta _0 = \mathbb {1}(g_1 > 1) \sum _{j=1}^{g_1-1} d_j\), where \(\mathbb {1}(\cdot )\) is the indicator function. Define \(\delta _1 = \sum _{j=1}^{g_1} d_j\). Next, recursively define \(\delta _{i+1}=\sum _{j=1}^{g_{i+1}-1} d_j - \delta _i\) for \(i \in \{1,\ldots ,|{\mathbf {g}}|-1\}\). Then for \(i, m \in \{1,\ldots ,|{\mathbf {g}}|\}\) (with \(i < m\), \(i+m \le |{\mathbf {g}}|\)),
Similarly,
Lastly,
by construction. \(\square \)
Proof of Lemma 2
Assume (A1)–(A4). Note (A3) implies
We seek to show
By (A3), (L2\(^\prime \)) implies \(P({{\mathbf{s}}}_{{\mathbf{g}}}|A)=P({{\mathbf{s}}}_{{\mathbf{g}}}|B)\).
The proof uses the following two results. First, suppressing the conditional probability notation,
Second, defining \({\mathbf {g}}_j^{+}=\{i \in {\mathbf {g}}|i\ge j\}\) and \({\mathbf {g}}_j^{-}=\{i \in {\mathbf {g}}|i < j\}\),
where \(\delta _{j-1}\) is constructed per Lemma 1. Since (L2\(^\prime \)) implies at least two of the signals are different, (L2.A) and (L2.B) cover all relevant cases. Suppose \(\exists \, i<j<k \;\text {for which} \; s_i = s_k \ne s_j\). Then \(P({{\mathbf{s}}}_{{\mathbf{g}}})=0\) by (L2.A). But \(s_i = s_k \ne s_j \Rightarrow {\bar{s}}_i = {\bar{s}}_k \ne {\bar{s}}_j\). Then \(P({\bar{\mathbf{s}}}_{{\mathbf{g}}})=0\) by (L2.A) again, so \(P({{\mathbf{s}}}_{{\mathbf{g}}})=P({\bar{\mathbf{s}}}_{{\mathbf{g}}})\). For the remaining sequences in the class of (L2.B), the result is immediate. \(\square \)
Proof of L2.A
Without loss of generality, suppose \(s_i=a_i\), \(s_j=b_j\), and \(s_k=a_k\). Assumption (A4) applies to the redefined system with \(i=1\), \(j=2\), and \(k=3\), per Lemma 1. Note that
By (A4), \(P(\alpha _1 \cap \alpha _2 \cap \alpha _3) = p - \delta _1 - \delta _2\). By another application of Lemma 1, then, \(P(\alpha _1 \cap \alpha _3)=p - \delta _1 - \delta _2\). Thus, \(P(\alpha _1 \cap \beta _2 \cap \alpha _3)=0\).
Proof of L2.B
The proof is by induction. Apply Lemma 1 to subgroup \(\mathbf {g+1}\) nesting \({\mathbf {g}}\) (with \(|\mathbf {g+1}|=|{\mathbf {g}}|+1\)). For \(|{\mathbf {g}}|=2\), by the application of (A4) to the redefined system, \(P(\alpha _1 \cap \beta _2)=\delta _1\). Then
where the second equality follows from De Morgan’s Law, so the induction hypothesis holds for \(|{\mathbf {g}}|=2\). For \(|{\mathbf {g}}|+1\), define \({\mathbf {g}}_j^{+}=\{i|j \le i \le |{\mathbf {g}}|\}\) and \({\mathbf {g}}_j^{-}=\{i|1 \le i < j\}\) for \(j \in {\mathbf {g}}\). Assume \(s_i=\alpha _i \; \forall i \in {\mathbf {g}}_j^{-}\) and \(s_i=\beta _i \, \forall i \in {\mathbf {g}}_j^{+}\) (the proof for the opposite case is similar). That is, consider a sequence of the form \((\alpha _1,\alpha _2,\ldots ,\alpha _{j-1},\beta _j,\beta _{j+1},\ldots , \beta _{|{\mathbf {g}}|})\) for some \(j \in \{2,3,\ldots ,|{\mathbf {g}}|\}\). Then
by (L2.A), so
\(\square \)
Proof of Proposition 2
Let \(\forall \mathbf {g'} \subseteq {\mathbf {g}} \in {\mathbb {G}}_{\mathbf {n}}\), and assume (S1) and (A1)–(A4). Without loss of generality, let \(S=A\), and suppress the conditional notation for the state of the world. Per Lemma 1,
where the equalities follow from Lemma 2 and the inequality from \(\mathbf {g'} \subseteq {\mathbf {g}}\). Similarly,
which establishes (1). For (2), note that (A4) and Lemma 2 imply
Likewise,
To establish the last equality, note \(P(a_1 \cup a_2) = P(a_1) + P(a_2) - P(a_1 \cap a_2) = 2p - (p - d_1)\) by (A4), so induction with Lemma 1 confirms \( P\left(\bigcup\nolimits_{{i \in {\mathbf{n}}}} {a_{i} } \right) = p + \sum\limits_{{j = 1}}^{{n - 1}} {d_{j} } \). \(\square \)
Proof of Proposition 3
For \({\mathbf {g}} \in {\mathbb {G}}_{\mathbf {n}}\) s.t. \(|{\mathbf {g}}| \in \{2x-1|x\in {\mathbb {N}}^+\}\), assume (S2), (A1)–(A4), and, without loss of generality, \(S={A}\). Apply Lemma 1, and suppress the conditional notation for the binary state. Let \(\mathbb {1}(\cdot )\) denote the indicator function. Define
with \({\mathbb {M}}_\beta \) its complementary set. Because \(|{\mathbf {g}}|\) is odd, the two sets cover all signal profiles.
Assumption (A4) implies \(P(\cap _{i \in {\mathbf {g}}} \alpha _i)=p-\sum _{j=1}^{|{\mathbf {g}}|-1}\delta _j\) and \(P(\cap _{i \in {\mathbf {g}}} \beta _i)=(1-p)-\sum _{j=1}^{|{\mathbf {g}}|-1}\delta _j\), where the proof of Proposition 2 confirms the latter equality. Define \({\mathbf {g}}_j^{+}=\{i \in {\mathbf {g}}|i\ge j\}\) and \({\mathbf {g}}_j^{-}=\{i \in {\mathbf {g}}|i < j\}\). By Lemma2, \(P({{\mathbf{s}}}_{{\mathbf{g}}})=0\) if \(\exists i<j<k\) for which \(s_i = s_k \ne s_j\). Also,
But then
\(\square \)
Proof of Proposition 4
The proof is by induction. Assume (S1), (A1)–(A3), and \(S=A\) (the proof for \(S=B\) is similar). The induction hypothesis clearly holds for \(n=1\). For illustration, consider the general case of \(n=2\) presented in Table 1 of Sect. 4.
By definition, \(x+y=p_2\), and \(x>1-p_1-y\) since \(p_1,p_2>1/2\). If \(p_2>p_1\) (equivalently, \(p_1-x<y\)), then \(P(\mu ^-|{\mathbf {n}})=p_1-x+1-p_1-y=1-p_2=1-\text {max}\{p_1,p_2\}\). If \(p_2<p_1\) (equivalently, \(p_1-x>y\)), then \(P(\mu ^-|{\mathbf {n}})=y+1-p_1-y=1-p_1=1-\text {max}\{p_1,p_2\}\). Lastly, if \(p_2=p_1\), then \(P(\mu ^-|{\mathbf {n}})=1-p_1-y<1-p_1=1-\text {max}\{p_1,p_2\}\). Therefore, \(P(\mu ^-|{\mathbf {n}})\le 1-\text {max}\{p_1,p_2\}\), and the induction hypothesis holds for \(n=2\).
Next consider the general case for \(n>2\). Index the \(n^2\) possible signal vectors by \(j=1,2,\ldots ,n^2\). Without loss of generality, order the signal vectors according to whether they create an “incorrect” or “correct” inference, with the “uninformative” cases at the end:
for some \(k \in \{1,2,\ldots ,n^2/2\}\) (Proposition 3 shows \(k\ge 1\)), where it is understood that if \(k=n^2/2\), no event is “uninformative.” Furthermore, let \({\mathbf {s}}_j=\mathbf {{\bar{s}}}_{j+n^2/2}\) for \(j=1,2,\ldots ,n^2/2\). Define \(\mu ^-_{aj}\), \(\mu _{aj}\), and \(\mu ^+_{aj}\) for the respective probabilities of intersections with \(a_{n+1}\). Likewise, define \(\mu ^-_{bj}\) for the conditional intersection of \(b_{n+1}\) and so on. Let \(\mathbb {1}(\cdot )\) denote the indicator function. Then, for \(\mathbf {n+1}\) nesting \({\mathbf {n}}\) (with \(|\mathbf {n+1}|=n+1\)),
Because
and
the induction hypothesis implies (via Lemma 1):
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 5. \(\square \)
Lemma 5
Assume (S1) and (A1)–(A3). Adopting the terminology and ordering of Proposition 4,
Proof of Lemma 5
Assume (S1) and (A1)–(A3). The proof is by induction. The induction hypothesis clearly holds for \(n=1\). Suppose \(n>1\). We seek to show
Because
and
by construction, then \(\Gamma \le 1-p_{n+1}\).
Next, because
and
the induction hypothesis implies
Thus, \(\Gamma \le 1-\max \nolimits _{i \in \mathbf {n+1}} p_i\). \(\square \)
Proof of Proposition 5
Assume (S1) and (A1)–(A3). Following the same approach and terminology of Proposition 4, the induction hypothesis clearly holds for \(n=1\). Let \(\mathbf {n+1}\) nest \({\mathbf {n}}\) (with \(|\mathbf {n+1}|=n+1\)). For \(n+1\), then,
Because
and
by construction, then \(P(\mu |\mathbf {n+1}) \le 2(1-p_{n+1})\). An exact analogy to Lemma 5 then establishes \(P(\mu |\mathbf {n+1}) \le 2(1-\max \nolimits _{i \in {\mathbf {n}}} p_i)\). Thus, \(P(\mu |\mathbf {n+1}) \le 2(1-\max \nolimits _{i \in \mathbf {n+1}} p_i)\). \(\square \)
Proof of Proposition 6
First, reversing the order of the summation,
Then
is a telescoping series, leaving
Then
which is greater than zero if and only if \(4p(1-p)>(n+1)/(n+2)\). Because \(Q(p) \equiv 4p(1-p)=1\) at its maximizer of \(p=1/2\), the solution to the corresponding quadratic equation yields
Because EU(p, n) is an affine function of F(p, n), the optimal group size is single-peaked. \(\square \)
Proof of Lemma 3
Kaniovski and Zaigraev (2011) show F(p, n) is an increasing function, with at most one inflection point, that lies above a chord between \(p=0\) and \(p=1\). Thus, F(p, n) is concave. \(\square \)
Proof of Lemma 4
Writing the optimal investment as a function of the group size, the first-order condition implies
for any n. To preserve monotonicity, suppose the group expands by two members. Then
Now suppose \(p^*(n+2)\ge p^*(n)\). The right-hand side of (L5) is then strictly greater than one by the convexity of \(\phi (p)\). By Proposition 1, F(p, n) is increasing and approaching one as n grows. Furthermore, the difference \(F(p,n+2)-F(p,n)\) is decreasing in n. From Lemma 3, F(p, n) is concave and approaches one as p grows. Thus, the left-hand side of (L5) must be strictly less than one if \(p^*(n+2)\ge p^*(n)\), a contradiction. \(\square \)
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Lundberg, A. The importance of expertise in group decisions. Soc Choice Welf 55, 495–521 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-020-01253-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-020-01253-3