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Monotone-path Dutta-Ray solutions on convex games

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Abstract.

It is well known that on the domain of convex games, the Dutta-Ray solution satisfies many desirable properties such as population-monotonicity, max consistency, converse max consistency, and conditional self-consistency. In this paper, we define a family of possibly non-symmetric and non-homogeneous generalizations of the Dutta-Ray solution, which we refer to as “monotone-path Dutta-Ray solutions.” We show that above four properties are preserved by our generalizations.

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Received: 25 August 2000/Accepted: 11 September 2001

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Hokari, T. Monotone-path Dutta-Ray solutions on convex games. Soc Choice Welfare 19, 825–844 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550200160

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550200160

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