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Harsanyi's impartial observer theorem with a restricted domain

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Abstract.

In this paper we extend Harsanyi's impartial observer theorem by showing that the large domain of social lotteries can be significantly restricted – it is sufficient that the domain consists only of constant extended lotteries.

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Received: 27 December 2000/Accepted: 12 September 2001

We thank Simon Grant, Edi Karni, Atsushi Kajii, Ben Polak, Yemima Thompson and John Weymark for their comments and the Israel Institute of Business Research for financial support.

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Safra, Z., Weissengrin, E. Harsanyi's impartial observer theorem with a restricted domain. Soc Choice Welfare 20, 177–187 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550200161

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550200161

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