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Go anywhere: user-verifiable authentication over distance-free channel for mobile devices

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Personal and Ubiquitous Computing Aims and scope

Abstract

Current mobile technology gives us ubiquitous services with personal mobile devices such as smart phones, tablet PCs, and laptops. With these mobile devices, the human users may wish to exchange sensitive data with others (e.g., their friends or their colleagues) over a secure channel. Public key cryptography is a good solution for establishing this secure channel. However, it is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attack, if the entities have no shared information. A number of techniques based on human-assisted out-of-band channels have been proposed to solve this problem. Unfortunately, these works have a common shortcoming: The human users must be colocated in close proximity. In this paper, we focus on how to construct a distance-free channel, which is not location-limited for establishing a secure channel between two users (devices). The proposed distance-free channel provides identification and authentication of the devices at the different locations using taken pictures or pre-stored images. The human user participates in the authentication process by sending and verifying an image. We describe the prototype implementation operated on a smart phone and show the experimental results when actually two smart phones share a common key using Diffie–Hellman key agreement over the proposed distance-free channel.

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Notes

  1. Its hexadecimal value is: FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1 29024E08 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD EF9519B3 CD3A431B 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245 E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 C4B1FE6 49286651 ECE65381 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF.

  2. The average trials to find hash collision is 2k−1 where one way hash function is h: {0,1}* → {0,1}k. If the attacker(s) could compute at most 1 trillion 1,024-bit modular exponentiations and hash operations per second, and we apply timeout rule to wait MMS message to ‘2 min’ (in worst case of very loose network), the attacker can succeed with probability 247/2255 = 2−208 (120 s → 120 trillion trials → 47 bits). It is very trivial possibility.

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Acknowledgments

We appreciate anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. This research was supported by Basic Science Research Program through the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) funded by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (2011-0011289).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. The Graduate School of Ajou University, Suwon, Republic of Korea

    Sukin Kang

  2. The Graduate School of Information and Communication, Ajou University, Suwon, Republic of Korea

    Jonguk Kim & Manpyo Hong

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  1. Sukin Kang
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Correspondence to Sukin Kang.

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Kang, S., Kim, J. & Hong, M. Go anywhere: user-verifiable authentication over distance-free channel for mobile devices. Pers Ubiquit Comput 17, 933–943 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00779-012-0531-4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00779-012-0531-4

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