Abstract
The iterated prisoners dilemma (IPD) is a simple model for the study of the emergence of cooperative behavior in populations of selfish individuals. In this work, we challenge the assumption that players move in synchrony, and develop a general Markovian model that allows the study of a wide spectrum of scenarios. Simulations show that the relative timing of player moves, and the reward for mutual cooperation, influences the strategy that eventually dominates the final population. For a synchronous environment, reciprocal behavior appears to be the key to the evolution of cooperation, while in an asynchronous environment, guarded generosity may be a route to the evolution of cooperation.
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Newth, D., Cornforth, D. The emergence of cooperation in the random asynchronous prisoner’s dilemma. Artif Life Robotics 12, 329–334 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10015-007-0487-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10015-007-0487-z