Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the relationship between commission rates and a firm’s success within a corporate strategic planning simulation experiment. Teams of students are assigned to the role of managers of a firm within a competitive market situation. They have the task to experience the complex situation in which they act as managers to increase the performance of a firm by setting specific parameters. Our most interesting parameter is the commission rate. The Marketing Game considers a reasonably complex and realistic situation for the participants. We examine to what extent subjects succeed in increasing a firm’s turnover and profit by varying the commission rates.
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Brandl, B., Leopold-Wildburger, U., Mietek, A. et al. How do commission rates influence a firm’s success? statistical analysis of a corporate strategy simulation experiment. Cent Eur J Oper Res 18, 553–566 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10100-010-0176-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10100-010-0176-1