Abstract
Problem detection in operational settings requires expertise and vigilance. It is a difficult task for individuals. If a problem is not detected early enough, the opportunity to avoid or reduce its consequences may be lost. Teams have many strengths that individuals lack. The team can attend to a wider range of cues than any of the individuals can. They can offer a wider range of expertise, represent different perspectives, reorganize their efforts to adapt to situational demands, and work in parallel. These should improve problem detection. However, teams can also fall victim to a wide range of barriers that may reduce their alertness, mask early problem indicators, confound attempts to make sense of initial data, and restrict their range of actions. Therefore, teams may not necessarily be superior to individuals at problem detection. The capability of a team to detect problems may be a useful measure of the team’s maturity and competence.
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Layers exist in deep water in which there is a drastic temperature change from one layer to the next. When this occurs sound bounces off the interface between the two layers rather than propagating through it.
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Klein, G. The strengths and limitations of teams for detecting problems. Cogn Tech Work 8, 227–236 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10111-005-0024-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10111-005-0024-6