Abstract
We consider a market which has two software firms without copy protection on their software. Economic models are used to analyze different scenarios, and the result shows that when the software protection environment is improving quickly, software firms should not protect their software products, since no copy protection (piracy) can help them to lock-in customers now and make higher profits in the near future. However, if the protection environment does not improve enough or worsens, firms that do not protect their software will not be able to benefit from the customers locked-in by pirate software, and they will be better off protecting their software products.
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The comments of an anonymous referee are gracefully acknowledged which made the paper a better one.
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Altinkemer, K., Guan, J. & Şahin, A. Online software distribution without enforcing copy protection as a strategic weapon. ISeB 3, 343–361 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10257-005-0009-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10257-005-0009-2