Abstract
The theory that human cognition proceeds through mental simulations, if true, would provide a parsimonious explanation of how the mechanisms of reasoning and problem solving integrate with and develop from mechanisms underlying forms of cognition that occur earlier in evolution and development. However, questions remain about whether simulation mechanisms are powerful enough to exhibit human-level reasoning and inference. In order to investigate this issue, we show that it is possible to characterize some of the most powerful modern artificial intelligence algorithms for logical and probabilistic inference as methods of simulating alternate states of the world. We show that a set of specific human perceptual mechanisms, even if not implemented using mechanisms described in artificial intelligence, can nevertheless perform the same operations as those algorithms. Although this result does not demonstrate that simulation theory is true, it does show that whatever mechanisms underlie perception have at least as much power to explain non-perceptual human reasoning and problem solving as some of the most powerful known algorithms.
Notes
We refer to inference and reasoning interchangeably as the process by which people come to believe or suspect new facts given existing facts. We intend this broadly to include, for example, subconscious and automatic inference in perception and language understanding in addition to cognition studied in the psychology of reasoning.
Following Jackendoff (2007), we avoid the word “representation” in order to make it clear that we are referring to nothing more than aspects of brain state. This is intended to avoid philosophical confusions regarding the use of the term.
It is perhaps less obvious (and not relevant to this paper) that logical or symbolic rule-based notions can capture analog (as opposed to discrete) aspect of cognition. However, many logics and rule systems take real numbers as values.
In fact, there is no reason why a production rule system might not be part of a pattern completion mechanism.
DPLL’s “world knowledge” is expressed in conjunctive normal form (CNF), e.g., (P or Q) and (P or not-Q or not-R) and…. The parenthesized “clauses” in CNF can be written as a rule. For example, (P or not-Q or not R) is logically equivalent to (R and Q) → P. DPLL’s elaboration step involves performing “unit propagation”. Unit propagation sets propositions to truth values implied by already inferred and/or assumed truth values. Thus, with the CNF above, if P is false, then Q is inferred.
Although not developed explicitly as a simulation theory, several aspects of Soar are consistent with this work. For example, Soar’s use of “problem spaces” to consider hypothetical actions is a kind of simulation. Further, Soar uses “impasses” to control its use of problem spaces. These impasses often involve conflicting options. Negative priming and the likelihood bias are both heuristics for dealing with conflicting options.
References
Aloul FA, Markov IL, Sakallah KA (2001) MINCE: a static global variable-ordering for SAT and BDD. Paper presented at the IEEE 10th international workshop on logic and synthesis
Anderson JR (2007) How can the human mind occur in the physical universe?. Oxford University Press, New York
Anderson JR, Lebiere C (1998) The atomic components of thought. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale
Barsalou LW (1999) Perceptual symbol systems. Behav Brain Sci 22:577–609
Barsalou LW (2005) Abstraction as dynamic interpretation in perceptual symbol systems. In: Gershkoff-Stowe L, Rakison D (eds) Building object categories. Erlbaum, Mahwah, pp 389–431
Barsalou LW, Niedenthal PM, Barbey A, Ruppert J (2003a) Social embodiment. In: Ross B (ed) The psychology of learning and motivation, vol 43. Academic Press, San Diego, pp 43–92
Barsalou LW, Simmons WK, Barbey A, Wilson CD (2003b) Grounding conceptual knowledge in modality-specific systems. Trends Cogn Sci 7:84–91. doi:10.1016/S1364-6613(02)00029-3
Bayardo RJ, Schrag RC (1997) Using CSP look-back techniques to solve real world SAT instances, (pdf document). Paper presented at the 14th national conference on artificial intelligence
Boroditsky L, Ramscar M (2002) The roles of body and mind in abstract thought. Psychol Sci 13(2):185–188. doi:10.1111/1467-9280.00434
Braine MDS, O’Brien DP (1998) Mental logic. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah
Carpenter RH, Williams ML (1995) Neural computation of log likelihood in control of saccadic eye movements. Nature 377(6544):59–62. doi:10.1038/377059a0
Cassimatis NL, Bugjaska M, Dugas S, Murugesan A, Bello P (2007) An architecture for adaptive algorithmic hybrids. Paper presented at the AAAI-07, Vancouver, BC
Damasio AR (1989) Time-locked multiregional retroactivation: a systems level proposal for the neural substrates of recall and recognition. Cognition 33:25–62. doi:10.1016/0010-0277(89)90005-X
Davis M, Putnam H (1960) A computing procedure for quantification theory. J ACM 7(1):201–215. doi:10.1145/321033.321034
Davis M, Logemann G, Loveland D (1962) A machine program for theorem proving. Commun ACM 5(7):394–397. doi:10.1145/368273.368557
Desimone R, Duncan J (1995) Neural mechanisms of selective visual attention. Annu Rev Neurosci 18:193–222. doi:10.1146/annurev.ne.18.030195.001205
Een N, Sorensson N (2005) MiniSat-A SAT solver with conflict-clause minimization. In: SAT 2005 Competition
Finke RA (1989) Principles of mental imagery. MIT Press, Cambridge
Geman S, Geman D (1984) Stochastic relaxation, Gibbs distributions, and the Bayesian restoration of images. IEEE Trans Pattern Anal Mach Intell 7:721–741
Heras F, Larrosa J, Oliveras A (2008) MiniMaxSAT: an efficient weighted max-SAT solve. J Artif Intell Res 31:1–32
Hoos HH, Stützle T (2002) SATLIB: an online resource for research on SAT. In: Gent IP, Maaren HV, Walsh T (eds) SAT 2000. IOS Press, Amsterdam, pp 283–292
Itti L, Koch C (2001) Computational modeling of visual attention. Nat Rev Neurosci 2(3):194–203. doi:10.1038/35058500
Jackendoff R (2007) Language, consciousness, culture: essays on mental structure. MIT Press, Cambridge
Johnson-Laird P (1983) Mental models. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Johnson-Laird PN (2007) How we reason. Oxford University Press, New York
Kaup B, Yaxley RH, Madden CJ, Zwaan RA, Lüdtke J (2007) Experiential simulations of negated text information. Q J Exp Psychol 60:976–990. doi:10.1080/17470210600823512
Kautz H, Selman B (1999) Unifying SAT-based and graph-based planning. Paper presented at the IJCAI-99
Kowler E (1990) The role of visual and cognitive processes in the control of eye movement. In: Kowler E (ed) The role of visual and cognitive processes in the control of eye movement. Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp 1–63
Kowler E, Martins AJ, Pavel M (1984) The effect of expectations on slow oculomotor control: IV anticipatory smooth eye movements depend on prior target motions. Vis Res 24(3):197–210. doi:10.1016/0042-6989(84)90122-6
Laird JE, Newell A, Rosenbloom PS (1987) Soar: an architecture for general intelligence. Artif Intell 33:1–64. doi:10.1016/0004-3702(87)90050-6
Lerner Y, Hendler T, Malach R (2002) Object-completion effects in the human lateral occipital complex. Cereb Cortex 12(2). doi:10.1093/cercor/12.2.163
Marques-Silva JP, Sakallah KA (1996) GRASP: a new search algorithm for satisfiability. Paper presented at the international conference on computer-aided design
Moskewicz M, Madigan C, Zhao Y, Zhang L, Malik S (2001) Chaff: engineering an efficient SAT solver. Paper presented at the 39th design automation conference, Las Vegas
Newell A, Shaw JC, Simon HA (1958) Elements of a theory of human problem solving. Psychol Rev 65:151–166. doi:10.1037/h0048495
Richardson DC, Spivey MJ, Barsalou LW, McRae K (2003) Spatial representations activated during real-time comprehension of verbs. Cogn Sci 27:767–780
Sang T, Beame P, Kautz H (2005) Solving Bayes networks by weighted model counting. Paper presented at the AAAI-05
Scholl BJ, Pylyshyn ZW (1999) Tracking multiple items through occlusion: clues to visual objecthood. Cogn Psychol 38:259–290. doi:10.1006/cogp.1998.0698
Spivey M (2006) The continuity of mind. Oxford University Press, New York
Tipper SP (1985) The negative priming effect: inhibitory priming with to be ignored objects. Q J Exp Psychol 37A:571–590
Tipper SP (2001) Does negative priming reflect inhibitory mechanisms? A review and integration of conflicting views. Q J Exp Psychol 54:321–343. doi:10.1080/02724980042000183
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Cassimatis, N.L., Murugesan, A. & Bignoli, P.G. Reasoning as simulation. Cogn Process 10, 343–353 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10339-009-0256-0
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10339-009-0256-0