Abstract
Marewski, Gaissmaier and Gigerenzer (2009) present a review of research on fast and frugal heuristics, arguing that complex problems are best solved by simple heuristics, rather than the application of knowledge and logical reasoning. We argue that the case for such heuristics is overrated. First, we point out that heuristics can often lead to biases as well as effective responding. Second, we show that the application of logical reasoning can be both necessary and relatively simple. Finally, we argue that the evidence for a logical reasoning system that co-exists with simpler heuristic forms of thinking is overwhelming. Not only is it implausible a priori that we would have evolved such a system that is of no use to us, but extensive evidence from the literature on dual processing in reasoning and judgement shows that many problems can only be solved when this form of reasoning is used to inhibit and override heuristic thinking.
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Acknowledgement
We thank Shira Elqayam for a critical reading of an earlier draft of this paper.
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Evans, J.S.B.T., Over, D.E. Heuristic thinking and human intelligence: a commentary on Marewski, Gaissmaier and Gigerenzer. Cogn Process 11, 171–175 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10339-009-0339-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10339-009-0339-y