Abstract
Can people improve the realism of their confidence judgments about the correctness of their episodic memory reports by deselecting the least realistic judgments? An assumption of Koriat and Goldsmith’s (Psychol Rev 103:490–517, 1996) model is that confidence judgments regulate the reporting of memory reports. We tested whether this assumption generalizes to the regulation of the realism (accuracy) of confidence judgments. In two experiments, 270 adults in separate conditions answered 50 recognition and recall questions about the contents of a just-seen video. After each answer, they made confidence judgments about the answer’s correctness. In Experiment 1, the participants in the recognition conditions significantly increased their absolute bias when they excluded 15 questions. In Experiment 2, the participants in the recall condition significantly improved their calibration. The results indicate that recall, more than recognition, offers valid cues for participants to increase the realism of their report. However, the effects were small with only weak support for the conclusion that people have some ability to regulate the realism in their confidence judgments.
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This project was funded by the Swedish Research Council (VR) with a grant to the second author.
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Buratti, S., Allwood, C.M. The accuracy of meta-metacognitive judgments: regulating the realism of confidence. Cogn Process 13, 243–253 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10339-012-0440-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10339-012-0440-5