Abstract
In the case of mechanism design with partial verification, where agents have restrictions on misreporting, the Revelation Principle does not always hold. Auletta et al. (J Auton Agent Multi-Agent Syst, to appear) proposed a characterization of correspondences for which the Revelation Principle holds, i.e., they described restrictions on misreporting under which a social choice function is implementable if and only if it is truthfully implementable. In this paper, we demonstrate that the characterization proposed in [1] is incorrect, and, building on their work, give a correct characterization. We also provide an example that demonstrates that our characterization is different from that of Auletta et al.
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References
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Yu, L. Mechanism design with partial verification and revelation principle. Auton Agent Multi-Agent Syst 22, 217–223 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10458-010-9151-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10458-010-9151-4