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Implementation of the Levels Structure Value

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Abstract

We implement the levels structure value (Winter, 1989) for cooperative transfer utility games with a levels structure. The mechanism is a generalization of the bidding mechanism by Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001).

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Correspondence to Juan J. Vidal-Puga.

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Vidal-Puga, J.J. Implementation of the Levels Structure Value. Ann Oper Res 137, 191–209 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-005-2255-6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-005-2255-6

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