Abstract
A basic problem in the theory of simple games and other fields is to study whether a simple game (Boolean function) is weighted (linearly separable). A second related problem consists in studying whether a weighted game has a minimum integer realization. In this paper we simultaneously analyze both problems by using linear programming.
For less than 9 voters, we find that there are 154 weighted games without minimum integer realization, but all of them have minimum normalized realization. Isbell in 1958 was the first to find a weighted game without a minimum normalized realization, he needed to consider 12 voters to construct a game with such a property. The main result of this work proves the existence of weighted games with this property with less than 12 voters.
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This research was partially supported by Grant MTM 2006-06064 of “Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología y el Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional” and SGRC 2005-00651 of “Generalitat de Catalunya”, and by the Spanish “Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología” programmes ALINEX (TIN2005-05446 and TIN2006-11345).
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Freixas, J., Molinero, X. On the existence of a minimum integer representation for weighted voting systems. Ann Oper Res 166, 243–260 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-008-0422-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-008-0422-2