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An order-centric treatment of the Bayesian supermodular game

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Abstract

We take an order-centric approach to an incomplete-information version of the supermodular game (SG). In particular, we first introduce concepts related to ordered normal form games and the stochastic dominance order. Then, we work on a Bayesian SG, for which we show the existence of a monotone equilibrium and its monotonic trend as the player type distribution varies. Our results complement those that appeared in the Bayesian-SG literature.

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Acknowledgements

The research of Jian Yang was supported by NSF Grant CMMI-0854803, and that of Xiangtong Qi was supported by the Hong Kong RGC grant GRF 618807.

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Appendices

Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1

By hypotheses and Fact 4, we see that \(\bar{B}\) is a monotone map from Q to Q. By Fact 3, we obtain the existence of Γ’s largest pure Nash equilibrium in Q.

Appendix B: Proof of Lemma 1

By hypotheses and Fact 4, we know that \(\bar{\mathcal{B}}\) is a monotone map from \({\mathcal{Q}}\cap Q^{T}\) to itself. We can then obtain the desired result by applying Fact 3.

Appendix C: Proof of Lemma 2

Given \(x\in {\mathcal{I}}(T,S)\cap Q^{T}\) and θT, consider the following subset of S n :

$$M_n(x(\theta),\theta)=\operatorname {argmax}_{x'_n\in S_n}f_n(x'_n,x_{-n}(\theta ),\theta),$$
(9)

which is a non-empty complete sublattice of S n due to the fact that S n is a complete lattice, f n ’s order upper semi-continuity and supermodularity in \(x'_{n}\) under the given x n (θ)∈Q n , and Fact 2. Note that \(x\in{ \mathcal{I}}(T,S)\). So under the above x and given θ 1,θ 2T with θ 1θ 2, we have x n (θ 1)≤x n (θ 2) as well. By this, the fact that f n has increasing differences in \(x'_{n}\) and \(x'_{-n}\in Q_{-n}\) as well as in \(x'_{n}\) and θ for fixed \(x'_{-n}\in Q_{-n}\), we know that \(f_{n}(x'_{n},x_{-n}(\theta),\theta)\) has increasing differences in \(x'_{n}\) and θ. Thus, Fact 1 will lead us to

$$ M_n(x(\theta^1),\theta^1)\leq_s M_n(x(\theta^2),\theta^2).$$
(10)

By definition, we have \(\bar{\mathcal{B}}_{n}(x)=(\sup M_{n}(x(\theta),\theta )\mid\theta\in T)\). From (10), we know that \(\bar{\mathcal{B}}_{n}(x)\) is monotone in θ. For every θT, since Γ(θ) is Q-preserving, we know that \(\bar{B}(x(\theta),\theta)\in Q\) just because x(θ)∈Q. Thus, we have \(\bar{\mathcal{B}}(x)\in {\mathcal{I}}(T,S)\cap Q^{T}\).

Appendix D: That weak affiliation along with the ≤ iib partial order is weaker than affiliation

Suppose probability \(p\in {\mathcal{P}}(R^{\mid N\mid})\) possesses a joint probability density function q[p]≡(q[p](θ)∣θ≡(θ 1,…,θ n )∈R N) with respect to the Lebesgue measure on R N. According to Milgrom and Weber (Milgrom and Weber 1982), we may call p affiliated when q[p] is log-supermodular in θ. It was shown that the affiliation of p will lead to (4) for each nN, where p n|n is the conditional probability kernel between θ n ≡(θ nn′≠n) and θ n that is induced by p.

Let \(p^{1},p^{2}\in{ \mathcal{P}}(R^{\mid N\mid})\) be two affiliated probabilities that possess densities q[p i]n|n , for i=1,2, for their conditional probability kernels with respect to the Lebesgue measure on R N∣−1. When p 2 is greater than p 1 in the affiliated ranking, i.e., when p 1 ar p 2, it will follow that q[p i]n|n (θ n θ n ) is log-supermodular in (i,θ n )∈{1,2}×R N∣−1 for every nN and θ n R. But this will lead to (5) for every nN.

Appendix E: Proof of Lemma 3

Let \((n,\theta_{n})\in{ \mathcal{N}}\), ordered chain \(C_{n,\theta_{n}}\subset {\mathcal{S}}_{n,\theta_{n}}= S_{n}\), and ϵ>0 be given. By (S1′), we know the existence of some \(y_{n,\theta_{n}}\in C_{n,\theta_{n}}\), so that, for any \(x_{-n}\in\Pi_{n'\neq n}{\mathcal{M}}(T_{n'},S_{n'})\), any θ n T n , and any \(x_{n,\theta_{n}}\in C_{n,\theta_{n}}\) with \(x_{n,\theta_{n}}\geq y_{n,\theta_{n}}\), it will follow that

$$f_n(x_{n,\theta_n},x_{-n}(\theta_{-n}),\theta_n,\theta_{-n})<f_n(\sup C_{n,\theta_n},x_{-n}(\theta_{-n}),\theta_n,\theta_{-n})+\epsilon.$$
(11)

Taking expectation on θ n with respect to probability p n|n (θ n ), we obtain

$$f^B_{n,\theta_n}(x_{n,\theta_n},x_{-n})<f^B_{n,\theta_n}(\sup C_{n,\theta_n},x_{-n})+\epsilon.$$
(12)

After symmetrically tackling the case involving \(\inf C_{n,\theta_{n}}\), we can conclude that \(f^{B}_{n,\theta_{n}}\) is order upper semi-continuous in \(x_{n,\theta_{n}}\) for fixed x n . So ΓB will satisfy (S1).

When each Γ(θ) satisfies (S2), we know that

(13)

for any nN, θ n T n , \(x^{1}_{n,\theta_{n}},x^{2}_{n,\theta _{n}}\in{ \mathcal{S}}_{n,\theta_{n}}\), \(x_{-n}\in\Pi_{n'\neq n}{\mathcal{M}}(T_{n'},S_{n'})\), and θ n T n . Taking expectation on θ n with respect to probability p n|n (θ n ), we obtain

(14)

So ΓB will satisfy (S2).

When each Γ(θ) satisfies (S3), we know that

(15)

for any \(x^{1},x^{2}\in\Pi_{n'\in N}{\mathcal{M}}(T_{n'},S_{n'})\) with x 1x 2, nN, and θT. Taking expectation on θ n with respect to probability p n|n (θ n ), we obtain

(16)

So ΓB will satisfy (S3). Therefore, it is supermodular as an ordered normal form game.

Appendix F: Proof of Lemma 4

For fixed nN, \(x^{1}_{n},x^{2}_{n}\in S_{n}\) with \(x^{1}_{n}\leq x^{2}_{n}\), and \(x_{-n}\in\Pi_{n'\neq n}{\mathcal{I}}(T_{n'},S_{n'})\), let g:TR be such that

$$ g(\theta_n,\theta_{-n})=f_n(x^2_n,x_{-n}(\theta_{-n}),\theta_n,\theta _{-n})-f_n(x^1_n,x_{-n}(\theta_{-n}),\theta_n,\theta_{-n}).$$
(17)

As the game family is supermodular and parametrically monotone, f n (y n ,y n n n ) has increasing differences in y n and y n as well as in y n and (ζ n n ). Hence, as x n is monotone in θ n , we have that g is monotone in both θ n and θ n . Define G(θ n ), so that

$$ G(\theta_n)=\int_{T_{-n}}g(\theta_n,\theta_{-n})\cdot p_{-n|n}(d\theta _{-n}|\theta_n).$$
(18)

By the membership of p in \({\mathcal{W}}\), we know that p n|n (θ n ) is stochastically monotone in θ n . Hence, G(θ n ) is monotone in θ n . But from (6), (17), and (18), we have

$$G(\theta_n)=f^B_{n,\theta_n}(x^2_n,x_{-n})-f^B_{n,\theta_n}(x^1_n,x_{-n}).$$
(19)

Thus, \(f^{B}_{n,\cdot}(\cdot,x_{-n})\), when viewed as a function of θ n and x n , has increasing differences in the two variables.

Given \(x\in\Pi_{n'\in N}{\mathcal{I}}(T_{n'},S_{n'})\), now consider the following non-empty complete sublattice of \({\mathcal{S}}_{n,\theta_{n}}\) for some arbitrary nN and θ n T n :

$$ M^B_{n,\theta_n}(x)=\operatorname {argmax}_{x'_n\in S_n}\;f^B_{n,\theta_n}(x'_n,x_{-n}).$$
(20)

By the above increasing-difference result on \(f^{B}_{n,\theta_{n}}\) and Fact 1, we know that \((M^{B}_{n,\theta _{n}}(x)\mid\allowbreak \theta_{n}\in \nobreak T_{n})\) is monotone in θ n in the strong set order sense. Consider \(\bar{B}^{B}_{n,\theta_{n}}(x)=\sup M^{B}_{n,\theta _{n}}(x)\). In view of (20), we know that \((\bar{B}^{B}_{n,\theta _{n}}(x)\mid\theta_{n}\in T_{n})\) is monotone in θ n , or equivalently, inside \({\mathcal{I}}(T_{n},S_{n})\), for the given \(x\in\Pi_{n'\in N}{\mathcal{I}}(T_{n'},S_{n'})\).

Appendix G: Proof of Theorem 1

Identify the current ΓB and \(\Pi_{n\in N}{\mathcal{I}}(T_{n},S_{n})\) with, respectively, Γ and Q in Proposition 1, and then apply the proposition.

Appendix H: Proof of Lemma 5

For fixed \((n,\theta_{n})\in{ \mathcal{N}}\), \(x^{1}_{n},x^{2}_{n}\in{ \mathcal{S}}_{n,\theta _{n}}\) with \(x^{1}_{n}\leq x^{2}_{n}\), and \(x_{-n}\in\Pi_{n'\neq n}{\mathcal{I}}(T_{n'},S_{n'})\), we introduce g:T n R so that

$$ g(\theta_{-n})=f_n(x^2_n,x_{-n}(\theta_{-n}),\theta_n,\theta _{-n})-f_n(x^1_n,x_{-n}(\theta_{-n}),\theta_n,\theta_{-n}).$$
(21)

Since the original game family is supermodular and parametrically monotone, we know that f n (y n ,y n n n ) has increasing differences in y n and y n as well as in y n and ζn . Hence, as x n is monotone in θ n , we know that g is monotone in θ n . Define G(p) so that

$$ G(p)=\int_{T_{-n}}g(\theta_{-n})\cdot p_{-n|n}(d\theta_{-n}\mid\theta_n).$$
(22)

The above monotonicity of g in θ n dictates that G(p) is monotone in p. But by (7), (21), and (22), we have

$$G(p)=f^B_{n,\theta_n}(x^2_n,x_{-n},p)-f^B_{n,\theta_n}(x^1_n,x_{-n},p).$$
(23)

So \(f^{B}_{n,\theta_{n}}(\cdot,x_{-n},\cdot)\), as a function of x n and p, has increasing differences in its two variables.

Appendix I: Proof of Theorem 2

Identify the current \((\Gamma^{B}(p)\mid p\in{ \mathcal{W}})\) and \(\Pi_{n\in N}{\mathcal{I}}(T_{n},S_{n})\) with, respectively, (Γ(θ)∣θT) and Q in Proposition 2, and then apply the proposition.

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Yang, J., Qi, X. An order-centric treatment of the Bayesian supermodular game. Ann Oper Res 208, 371–381 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-012-1065-x

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