Abstract
Research on the quality of narrative information of annual financial reports has long been dominated by a lack of tools that permit an objective analysis of qualitative disclosure. This study is focused on accounting disclosure research and proposes a comprehensive index that uses Key Performance Indicators to enhance understanding of the quality of narrative information during the period of 2002–2007, using a sample of European (EU) and USA (US) firms operating in that context. We use previous research of Garefalakis et al. (Corp Ownersh Control 13(4):317–334, 2016) to underscore the relation between the Management Commentary Index and the Weighted Management Commentary Index with several explanatory variables that put emphasis on firms’ attributes regarding their volumes in total assets, their book values, as well as the use of corporate governance indicators, etc. in a regional level. Our results show that the US firms with the mandatory requirements do not provide a greater amount of disclosure information in their reporting than their counterparts in Europe (i.e. firms located in Western and Northern Europe). The proposed approach seeks to enhance understanding of the quality of companies’ narrative information disclosure and reveals a critical path to analyze the link between corporate governance and firms’ performance.
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Notes
The Big Four Companies are the four largest Audit firms worldwide, offering a variety of services specified in audit, taxation, insurance services, consulting and other services, e.g. Ernst & Young, PwC, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, and KPMG.
Thomson Reuters® ASSET4 ESG used in this study in order to get Economical Social and Corporate Governance (ESG) research data, to evaluate corporate performance through financial disclosure. The ESG database contains information on over 7000+ companies, including all aspects of companies’ sustainability performance.
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Appendix
Appendix
1.1 Regressions results: Regional #1
Variable | ALL | ALL_US | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
MA.CO.I. | MA.CO.I.w | MA.CO.I. | MA.CO.I.w | |||||
Coefficient | Prob | Coefficient | Prob. | Coefficient | Prob | Coefficient | Prob. | |
C | 0.168151 | 0.0001** | 0.144841 | 0.0000** | 0.114720 | 0.2257 | 0.110387 | 0.0075** |
LAW_COCI | − 0.009751 | 0.0535* | 0.004958 | 0.1891 | ||||
ROA | − 0.090791 | 0.0000** | − 0.056458 | 0.0000** | − 0.048716 | 0.0337* | − 0.051765 | 0.0071** |
LN_TA | 0.012660 | 0.0000** | 0.006578 | 0.0000** | 0.014492 | 0.0000** | 0.008302 | 0.0000** |
NOSH | 6.79E−10 | 0.0000** | 4.48E−10 | 0.1438 | 7.09E−10 | 0.0000** | 3.79E−10 | 0.1225 |
TBV | − 1.53E−06 | 0.8552 | 4.77E−06 | 0.3337 | 0.000468 | 0.1660 | 0.000397 | 0.0921 |
ASS_TURN | 0.009236 | 0.0000** | 0.000583 | 0.5029 | 0.011025 | 0.0002** | 0.001298 | 0.4322 |
CGBFDP0014 | 0.023420 | 0.0000** | 0.012128 | 0.0199* | 0.023378 | 0.0000** | 0.007781 | 0.1170 |
CGBFDP018 | 0.000343 | 0.0631 | 0.000192 | 0.0028** | − 9.53E−05 | 0.7706 | − 0.000102 | 0.1292 |
ECSLO05S | 0.000362 | 0.0004** | 0.000226 | 0.0117* | 0.000295 | 0.0006** | 0.000143 | 0.0353* |
CGBSDP061 | 0.014179 | 0.0003** | 0.005610 | 0.1227 | 0.039356 | 0.0007** | 0.028695 | 0.0096** |
CGBSDP060 | − 1.57E−05 | 0.9746 | − 0.000432 | 0.1438 | 8.43E−05 | 0.9345 | 0.000691 | 0.0217* |
CGBFDP028 | 0.000242 | 0.0000** | 0.000152 | 0.0000** | 0.000345 | 0.0000** | 0.000151 | 0.0009** |
CGVSDP029 | 0.085042 | 0.0000** | 0.043995 | 0.0000** | 0.071315 | 0.0000** | 0.038875 | 0.0000** |
WC01801 | 2.17E−10 | 0.7762 | − 6.89E−10 | 0.1472 | − 1.03E−11 | 0.9816 | − 5.68E−10 | 0.0694 |
R2 | 0.339131 | 0.292345 | 0.323655 | 0.298918 | ||||
F-statistic | 5.547.514 | 4.466.021 | 2.860.579 | 2.548.720 | ||||
Prob (F-statistic) | 0.000000 | 0.000000 | 0.000000 | 0.000000 | ||||
1.2 Regional #2
Variable | ALL_EUROPEAN | P_IFRS_USA | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
MA.CO.I. | MA.CO.I.w | MA.CO.I. | MA.CO.I.w | |||||
Coefficient | Prob | Coefficient | Prob. | Coefficient | Prob | Coefficient | Prob. | |
C | 0.213320 | 0.0000** | 0.203671 | 0.0000** | 0.145419 | 0.3888 | 0.104085 | 0.1581 |
LAW_COCI | 0.002389 | 0.6482 | 0.005115 | 0.2543 | ||||
ROA | − 0.105755 | 0.0000** | − 0.053593 | 0.0006** | − 0.087650 | 0.0009** | − 0.043499 | 0.1898 |
LN_TA | 0.009941 | 0.0000** | 0.003874 | 0.0000** | 0.013668 | 0.0144* | 0.007671 | 0.0100* |
NOSH | 8.02E−10 | 0.7730 | 1.26E−09 | 0.4188 | 8.31E−10 | 0.4868 | − 3.64E−10 | 0.6878 |
TBV | − 2.05E−07 | 0.9790 | 5.44E−06 | 0.2163 | − 0.000266 | 0.6339 | 3.22E−05 | 0.9568 |
ASS_TURN | 0.004468 | 0.0412* | − 0.001008 | 0.5677 | 0.013608 | 0.0019** | 0.001538 | 0.6021 |
CGBFDP0014 | 0.014897 | 0.0044** | 0.014645 | 0.0204* | 0.025800 | 0.0000** | 0.011795 | 0.2377 |
CGBFDP018 | 0.000486 | 0.0003** | 0.000260 | 0.0000** | − 0.000117 | 0.7849 | − 7.92E−05 | 0.4397 |
ECSLO05S | 0.000505 | 0.0019** | 0.000376 | 0.0046** | 0.000234 | 0.0320* | 4.79E−05 | 0.5898 |
CGBSDP061 | 0.008034 | 0.1009 | − 0.000280 | 0.9254 | 0.051349 | 0.0000** | 0.042853 | 0.0000** |
CGBSDP060 | 0.000211 | 0.5235 | − 0.000502 | 0.1739 | − 0.001070 | 0.4068 | 0.000611 | 0.0302* |
CGBFDP028 | 7.31E−05 | 0.4161 | 0.000117 | 0.0047** | 0.000370 | 0.0000** | 0.000145 | 0.0635 |
CGVSDP029 | 0.093370 | 0.0000** | 0.046617 | 0.0000** | 0.091354 | 0.0000** | 0.052546 | 0.0000** |
WC01801 | 1.08E−09 | 0.2108 | 5.47E−11 | 0.9216 | − 2.83E−10 | 0.1816 | − 7.20E−10 | 0.0048** |
R2 | 0.379343 | 0.294780 | 0.247747 | 0.181543 | ||||
F-statistic | 3.084.935 | 2.109.789 | 1.176.841 | 7.926.081 | ||||
Prob (F-statistic) | 0.000000 | 0.000000 | 0.000000 | 0.000000 | ||||
1.3 Regional #3—A_IFRS_USA
Variable | MA.CO.I. | MA.CO.I.w | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
Coefficient | Prob | Coefficient | Prob. | |
C | 0.121386 | 0.0001** | 0.141886 | 0.0001** |
LAW_COCI | ||||
ROA | − 0.004273 | 0.8775 | − 0.053795 | 0.0173* |
LN_TA | 0.014009 | 0.0000** | 0.008338 | 0.0000** |
NOSH | 7.83E−10 | 0.0000** | 5.48E−10 | 0.0000** |
TBV | 0.000820 | 0.0028** | 0.000609 | 0.0000** |
ASS_TURN | 0.006562 | 0.0035** | 0.000280 | 0.8775 |
CGBFDP0014 | 0.020524 | 0.0000** | 0.003990 | 0.0375* |
CGBFDP018 | − 3.50E−05 | 0.0877 | − 8.83E−05 | 0.0016** |
ECSLO05S | 0.000372 | 0.0008** | 0.000243 | 0.0017** |
CGBSDP061 | 0.002329 | 0.7753 | − 0.006805 | 0.0000** |
CGBSDP060 | 0.002451 | 0.0027** | 0.001364 | 0.0120* |
CGBFDP028 | 0.000349 | 0.0000** | 0.000171 | 0.0029** |
CGVSDP029 | 0.059828 | 0.0002** | 0.030889 | 0.0063** |
WC01801 | 5.92E−10 | 0.0055** | − 2.76E−11 | 0.9112 |
R2 | 0.437271 | 0.451526 | ||
F-statistic | 2.730.049 | 2.892.313 | ||
Prob (F-statistic) | 0.000000 | 0.000000 | ||
1.4 Regional #4
Variable | P_IFRS_EUROPEAN | A_IFRS_EUROPEAN | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
MA.CO.I. | MA.CO.I.w | MA.CO.I. | MA.CO.I.w | |||||
Coefficient | Prob | Coefficient | Prob. | Coefficient | Prob | Coefficient | Prob. | |
C | 0.152062 | 0.0019** | 0.202489 | 0.0000** | 0.231146 | 0.0000** | 0.194831 | 0.0000** |
LAW_COCI | 0.006287 | 0.5231 | 0.003855 | 0.6084 | 0.004860 | 0.0000** | 0.010322 | 0.0000** |
ROA | − 0.042445 | 0.1582 | − 0.059040 | 0.2260 | − 0.108625 | 0.0000** | − 0.047563 | 0.0003** |
LN_TA | 0.014061 | 0.0000** | 0.004537 | 0.0006** | 0.006906 | 0.0000** | 0.003127 | 0.0000** |
NOSH | − 1.68E−09 | 0.2229 | 2.28E−10 | 0.7952 | 8.54E−09 | 0.0000** | 5.44E−09 | 0.0000** |
TBV | 8.42E−06 | 0.0000** | 1.08E−05 | 0.0000** | − 1.78E−05 | 0.0000** | − 3.04E−06 | 0.0458* |
ASS_TURN | 0.001786 | 0.4142 | 0.001793 | 0.0021** | 0.005823 | 0.0030** | − 0.004062 | 0.0886 |
CGBFDP0014 | 0.014744 | 0.0000** | 0.023479 | 0.0186* | 0.014679 | 0.1649 | 0.010574 | 0.1042 |
CGBFDP018 | 0.000374 | 0.1049 | 0.000222 | 0.0004** | 0.000652 | 0.0000** | 0.000333 | 0.0000** |
ECSLO05S | 0.000176 | 0.2654 | 0.000113 | 0.5542 | 0.000734 | 0.0000** | 0.000525 | 0.0000** |
CGBSDP061 | 0.005056 | 0.4812 | − 0.001260 | 0.8186 | 0.009026 | 0.0606 | − 0.001763 | 0.3300 |
CGBSDP060 | − 0.000194 | 0.6686 | − 0.001221 | 0.0000** | 0.001261 | 0.0000** | 0.000639 | 0.0003** |
CGBFDP028 | 0.000129 | 0.5008 | − 2.19E−05 | 0.5705 | − 9.68E−06 | 0.8983 | 0.000131 | 0.0000** |
CGVSDP029 | 0.088361 | 0.0000** | 0.041881 | 0.0000** | 0.087647 | 0.0000** | 0.043560 | 0.0000** |
WC01801 | 2.53E−10 | 0.5166 | − 4.44E−10 | 0.0456* | 6.35E−09 | 0.0000** | 3.95E−09 | 0.0000** |
R2 | 0.269353 | 0.128893 | 0.499899 | 0.500660 | ||||
F-statistic | 1.048.348 | 4.207.737 | 3.061.263 | 3.070.592 | ||||
Prob(F-statistic) | 0.000000 | 0.000000 | 0.000000 | 0.000000 | ||||
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Garefalakis, A., Sariannidis, N. & Lemonakis, C. Operational elements of Narrative Disclosure Information (NDI) in a geographical context. Ann Oper Res 294, 123–149 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-018-3075-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-018-3075-9