Abstract
In this paper, we extend the Banzhaf–Coleman–Dubey–Shapley sensitivity index to the class of dichotomous voting games with several levels of approval in input, also known as (j, 2)-simple games. For previous works, on classical simple games ((2, 2)-simple games), a sensitivity index reflects the volatility or degree of suspense in the voting body. Using a set of independent axioms, we provide an axiomatic characterization of that extension on the class of (j, 2)-simple games.
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Mbama Engoulou, B., Wambo, P. & Diffo Lambo, L. Banzhaf–Coleman–Dubey–Shapley sensitivity index for simple multichoice voting games. Ann Oper Res 328, 1349–1364 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-023-05411-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-023-05411-5