Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Formal models of coherence and legal epistemology

  • Original Paper
  • Published:
Artificial Intelligence and Law Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This paper argues that formal models of coherence are useful for constructing a legal epistemology. Two main formal approaches to coherence are examined: coherence-based models of belief revision and the theory of coherence as constraint satisfaction. It is shown that these approaches shed light on central aspects of a coherentist legal epistemology, such as the concept of coherence, the dynamics of coherentist justification in law, and the mechanisms whereby coherence may be built in the course of legal decision-making.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Putnam (1981, pp. 132–133).

  2. Wintgens (2007, forthcoming).

  3. Coherence theories of legal justification have been very popular in the last decades. While few legal scholars would endorse an account of legal justification in terms of coherence, the view that coherence is at least an important ingredient of legal justification is widely shared in contemporary legal theory. For a discussion of the current state of the coherence theory in law, see Amaya (2006, chapters 1 and 2).

  4. For a clear and brief introduction to belief revision formalisms, see Gärdenfors (1992) and Gärdenfors and Rott (1995). A more in-depth introduction is provided by Hansson (1999a).

  5. Alchourrón et al. (1985).

  6. For the rationality postulates for expansion and representation theorems, see Gärdenfors (1988, pp. 48–52).

  7. For a statement of the postulates for revision, see Gärdenfors (1988, pp. 52–60).

  8. These six postulates are called the ‘basic set’ of postulates. Two further postulates for contractions with respect to conjunctions are added: ‘intersection’, i.e., K ÷ p ∩ K ÷ q ⊆ K ÷ p&q, and ‘conjunction’, i.e., If p ∉ K ÷ p&q, then K ÷ p&q ⊆ K÷p. The former requires that the beliefs that are both in the contracted set K ÷ p and K ÷ q, are also in the contraction of K by p and q. The last postulate expresses the idea that everything that is retained in K ÷ p&q is also retained in K ÷ p.

  9. The most detailed argument for a coherentist interpretation of AGM has been provided by Gärdenfors (1990)—reprinted in Gärdenfors (2005). In this work, Gärdenfors contrasts AGM with an alternative approach to belief revision, namely, Doyle’s Truth Mantainance System (TMS), which, in his view, follows the foundations theory. Dolye has agreed with Gärdenfors concerning the epistemological interpretation of AGM and TMS, but argued that TMS provides the most practical means of mechanizing coherence approaches in Dolyle (1992). For a critique of the view that AGM may be plausibly interpreted as a version of coherentism, see Hansson and Olsson (1999) and Schaffer (2002).

  10. See Sect. 4 below.

  11. Hansson and Olsson (1999).

  12. See Olsson (1997a, b, 1998, 1999).

  13. Hansson (1994, 1997a).

  14. For a brief introduction to non-prioritized models of belief revision, see Hansson (1997b). Hansson provides a survey of recent research in this area in Hansson (1999b).

  15. Klein and Warfield (1994).

  16. For a statement of the postulates and representation theorems for subtractive and additive consolidation, see Olsson (1998).

  17. Olsson (1997b).

  18. On the distinction between systemic and relational coherence as well as on the relations between them, see Bender (1989, pp. 2–3), Baltelborth (1999, 218f), and Williams (1996, p. 276).

  19. Olsson (1997b, p. 120).

  20. Olsson (1999).

  21. Fuhrmann (1997, pp. 80–85).

  22. I borrow the term ‘re-interpretation’ from Conte (1999, p. 88).

  23. Simon (2004, p. 85ff).

  24. See Wassermann (1999, 2001, 2003) as well as Hansson and Wassermann (2002).

  25. Sintonen and Kiikeri (2004, pp. 214–218).

  26. See Martin and Osherson (1997, 1998, 2002).

  27. Harman (1995, p. 178, and pp. 183–186) and Nozick (1993, p. 85 and pp. 89–93).

  28. BonJour (1989, p. 284, 1999, p. 124).

  29. Priest (2001), Mares (2002), and Tanaka (2005).

  30. Hansson (2004, p. 256).

  31. The relevance of belief revision formalisms to the analysis of epistemological problems has been argued by Rott (2001, pp. 46–65) and (Hansson, 2004). On the connections between belief revision and issues in informal philosophy, see Hansson (2003). For a strong criticism of the utility of these formalisms for developing an epistemological theory, see Pollock and Gillies (2000).

  32. Thagard and Verbeurgt (1998, p. 3).

  33. See Thagard (1989, 1992, 2000).

  34. As a matter of fact, the theory of explanatory coherence was proposed before the general theory of coherence as constraint satisfaction was developed.

  35. See Thagard (2000), for a statement and discussion of the theories of deliberative, conceptual, analogical, perceptual, and deductive coherence.

  36. See Thagard (1989, 2003, 2004a, b, 2005, 2006a, b).

  37. Thagard (2006b).

  38. See Thagard (2003, p. 366) and Amaya (2006, pp. 890–894) for suggestions about how Thagard’s theory of coherence may be amended so as to incorporate the institutional constraints under which the evaluation of explanatory hypotheses in law proceeds.

  39. Bench-Capon and Sartor (2001) have adapted Thagard’s approach to coherence to their theory of case-based reasoning as a kind of reasoning that involves theory construction, use, and theory evaluation. In this approach, cases are taken to provide evidence for the competing theories and cases, rules, and preferences are viewed as units. See also Bench-Capon and Sartor (2003, pp. 135–136). For a proposal as to how a theory of normative coherence for law could be developed on the basis of Thagard’s framework, see Amaya (2006, pp. 897–905).

References

  • Alchourrón CE, Gärdenfors P, Makinson D (1985) On the logic of theory change: partial meet contraction and revision functions. J Symbol Logic 50:510–530

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Amaya A (2006) An inquiry into the nature of coherence and its role in legal argument, PhD thesis, European University Institute

  • Balterborth T (1999) Coherence and explanations. Erkenntnis 50:209–224

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Bench-Capon T, Sartor G (2001) Theory-based explanation of case law domains. In: Proceedings of the eighth international conference on AI and Law, 12–21 St Louis, MO ACM Press, New York

  • Bench-Capon T, Sartor G (2003) A model of legal reasoning with cases incorporating theories and values. Artif Intel Law 150:97–113

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Bender J (1989) Coherence, justification, and knowledge: the current debate. In: Bender J (ed) The current state of the coherence theory: critical essays on the epistemic theories of Keith Lehrer and Lawrence BonJour, with replies, Kluwer, Dordrecht, pp 1–14

    Google Scholar 

  • BonJour L (1989) Replies and clarifications. In: Bender J (ed) The current state of the coherence theory, Kluwer, Dordrecht, pp 276–292

  • BonJour L (1999) The dialectic of foundationalism and coherentism. In: Greco J, Sosa E (eds) The Blackwell guide to epistemology, Blackwell, Oxford, pp 117–142

    Google Scholar 

  • Conte ME (1999) Condizioni di Coerenza: Ricerche di Linguistica Testuale. Edizioni dell’Orso, Firenze

    Google Scholar 

  • Doyle J (1992) Reason maintenance and belief revision: foundations vs coherence theories. In: Gärdenfors P (ed) Belief revision, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 29–51

    Google Scholar 

  • Furhmann A (1997) An essay on contraction. CSLI Publications, Stanford

    Google Scholar 

  • Gärdenfors P (1988) Knowledge in flux: modeling the dynamics of epistemic states. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Gärdenfors P (1990) The dynamics of belief systems: foundations vs. coherence theories. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 172:24–46

    Google Scholar 

  • Gärdenfors P (1992) Belief revision: an introduction. In: Gärdenfors P (ed) Belief revision. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 1–27

    Google Scholar 

  • Gärdenfors P (2005) The dynamics of thought. Springer, Dordrecht

    Google Scholar 

  • Gärdenfors P, Rott H (1995) Belief revision. In: Gabbay DM, Hogger CJ, Robinson JA (eds) Handbook of logic in artificial intelligence and logic programming, vol 4, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 35–132

  • Hansson SO (1994) Taking belief bases seriously. In: Prawitz D, Westertøahl D (eds) Logic and philosophy of science in Uppsala. Kluwer, Dordrecht, pp 13–28

    Google Scholar 

  • Hansson SO (1997a) Semi-revision. J Appl Non-Classical Logic 7:151–175

    MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Hansson SO (1997b) What’s new isn’t always best. Theoria 63:1–13

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Hansson SO (1999a) A textbook of belief dynamics. Kluwer, Dordrecht

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Hansson SO (1999b) A survey of non-prioritized belief revision. Erkenntnis 51:413–427

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hansson SO (2003) Ten philosophical problems in belief revision. J Logic Comput 13:37–49

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Hansson SO, Wassermann R (2002) Local change. Studia Logica 70:49–76

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Hansson SO (2004) Belief revision from an epistemological point of view. In: Niiniluoto I, Sintonen M, Wolénski J (eds) Handbook of epistemology. Kluwer, Dordrecht, pp 255–279

    Google Scholar 

  • Hansson SO, Olsson EJ (1999) Providing foundations for coherentism. Erkenntnis 51:243–265

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Harman G (1995) Rationality. In: Smith EE, Osherson DN (eds) An invitation to cognitive science, vol 3. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 175–212

  • Klein P, Warfield TA (1994) What price coherence? Analysis 54:129–132

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mares ED (2002) A paraconsistent theory of belief revision. Erkenntnis 56:229–246

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Martin E, Osherson D (1997) Scientific discovery based on belief revision. J Symbol Logic 62:1352–1370

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Martin E, Osherson D (1998) Elements of scientific inquiry. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Martin E, Osherson D (2002) Scientific discovery from the perspective of hypothesis acceptance. Philos Sci 69:S331–S341

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nozick R (1993) The nature of rationality. Princeton University Press, Princeton

    Google Scholar 

  • Olsson EJ (1997a) Coherence: studies in epistemology and belief revision, PhD thesis, Uppsala University

  • Olsson EJ (1997b) A coherence interpretation of semi-revision. Theoria 63:105–134

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Olsson EJ (1998) Making beliefs coherent. J Logic Lang Inform 7:143–163

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Olsson EJ (1999) Cohering with. Erkenntnis 50:273–291

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Pollock JL, Gillies AS (2000) Belief revision and epistemology. Synthese 122:69–92

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Priest G (2001) Paraconsistent belief revision. Theoria 67:214–228

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Putnam H (1981) Reason, truth and history. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Rott H (2001) Change, choice and inference: a study of belief revision and nonmonotonic reasoning. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Shaffer MJ (2002) Coherence, justification, and the AGM theory of belief revision. In: Bouchard Y (ed) Perspectives on coherentism. Scribe, Aylmer, pp 139–160

    Google Scholar 

  • Simon D (2004) A third view of the black box: cognitive coherence in legal decision-making. Univ Chicago Law Rev 65:511–586

    Google Scholar 

  • Sintonen M, Kiikeri M (2004) Scientific discovery. In: Niiniluoto, I, Sintonen, M, Wolénski, J (eds) Handbook of epistemology, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, pp 205–253

  • Tanaka K (2005) The AGM theory and inconsistent belief change. Logique et Analyse 48:113–151

    MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Thagard P (1989) Explanatory coherence. Behav Brain Sci 12:435–467

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Thagard P (1992) Conceptual revolutions. Princeton University Press, Princeton

    Google Scholar 

  • Thagard P (2000) Coherence in thought and action. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Thagard P (2003) Why wasn’t OJ convicted? Emotional coherence in legal inference. Cogn Emot 17:361–383

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Thagard P (2004a) Causal inference in legal decision making: explanatory coherence vs Bayesian networks. Appl Artif Intel 18:231–249

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Thagard P (2004b) What is doubt and when is it reasonable? In: Ezcurdia M, Stainton R, Viger C (eds) New essays in the philosophy of language and mind. Can J Philos 30:391S–406S

  • Thagard P (2005) Testimony, credibility, and explanatory coherence. Erkentnnis 63:295–316

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Thagard P (2006a) Evaluating explanations in law, science, and everyday life. Curr Direct Psychol Sci 15:141–145

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Thagard P (2006b) Hot thought: mechanisms and applications of emotional cognition. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Thagard P, Verbeurgt K (1998) Coherence as constraint satisfaction cognitive. Science 22:1–24

    Google Scholar 

  • Wassermann R (1999) Resource bounded belief revision. Erkenntnis 50:429–446

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Wassermann R (2001) On structured belief bases. In: Williams MA, Rott H (eds) Frontiers in belief revision. Kluwer, Dordrecht, pp 349–367

    Google Scholar 

  • Wassermann R (2003) Generalized change and the meaning of rationality postulates. Studia Logica 73:200–319

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Williams M (1996) Unnatural doubts: epistemological realism and the basis of skepticism. Princenton University Press, Princeton

    Google Scholar 

  • Wintgens L (2007, forthcoming) Making sense of coherence: the level theory of coherence. Artif Intel Law

Download references

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Jorge Cerdio, Rossella Rubino, and Frederick Schauer for comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I thank an anonymous reviewer for his comments.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Harvard Law School, Harvard University, 1557 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA, 02138, USA

    Amalia Amaya

Authors
  1. Amalia Amaya
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Amalia Amaya.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Amaya, A. Formal models of coherence and legal epistemology. Artif Intell Law 15, 429–447 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10506-007-9050-4

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10506-007-9050-4

Keywords

Search

Navigation