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Machine learning based control rights analysis of critical resources and the optimal ownership for management integration

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Abstract

The paper first divides control rights of critical resources into government macroeconomic regulation power and insider control power for the management. After the discussion of the current status of Chinese coal industry integration, the paper mathematically and empirically analyzes influences of the government and state owned enterprises’ management to ownership’s boundary, and suggests the optimal ownership in different cases. The contributions of the paper are as follows: (1) Based on incomplete contract theory, the paper builds two mathematical models -the model of management’s investment level of relationship-specific human capital and ownership boundary model demonstrating the government utility under different ownership cases; (2) With the application of numerical simulation and empirical test, the paper analyzes impacts on coal resource integration from the aspects of government regulation and insider control, and discusses the optimal option of ownerships. By the analysis of the control power and ownership boundary based on the models, the paper eventually raises the optimal option of ownership allocation.

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Acknowledgments

We thank for the support of The National Social Science Fund Project (12BGL044);the Education of Jiangsu Province “12th Five-Year Plan” Planning Issues (D/2013/01/007), the 2015 Graduate Education Reform Project of Jiangsu Province (JGZZ15_029), Xuzhou 2015 Soft Science Project(KC15RH117).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou, 221116, Jiangsu, China

    Ziyuan Sun, Yunhai Zhu, Ying Li, Mengdi Xie & Gang Li

  2. The Xinbao (Tianjin) Equity Investment Fund Management Co. Ltd, Guangzhou, 510623, Guangdong, China

    Jianhua Song

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  1. Ziyuan Sun
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  2. Yunhai Zhu
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  3. Ying Li
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  5. Gang Li
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Correspondence to Gang Li.

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Sun, Z., Zhu, Y., Li, Y. et al. Machine learning based control rights analysis of critical resources and the optimal ownership for management integration. Cluster Comput 19, 1925–1935 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10586-016-0660-z

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