Abstract
The increasing knowledge intensity of jobs, typical of a knowledge economy, highlights the role of firms as integrators of know how and skills. As economic activity becomes mainly intellectual and requires the integration of specific and idiosyncratic skills, firms need to allocate skills to tasks and traditional hierarchical control may result increasingly ineffective. In this work, we explore under what circumstances networks of agents, which bear specific skills, may self-organize in order to complete tasks. We use a computer simulation approach and investigate how local interaction of agents, endowed with skills and individual decision-making rules, may produce aggregate network structure able to perform tasks. To design algorithms that mimic individual decision-making, we borrow from computer science literature and, in particular, from studies addressing protocols that produce cooperation in P2P networks. We found that self-organization depends on imitation of successful peers, competition among agents holding specific skills, and the structural features of, formal or informal, organizational networks embedding both professionals, holding skills, and project managers, holding access to jobs.
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Edoardo Mollona acknowledges financial support received within the research project sponsored by the Italian Ministry of the University and Scientific Research titled “The evolution of clusters of firms: emerging technological and organizational architectures” (n RBNE03HJZZ_003).
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Mollona, E., Marcozzi, A. FirmNet: the scope of firms and the allocation of task in a knowledge-based economy. Comput Math Organ Theory 15, 109–126 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10588-008-9049-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10588-008-9049-8