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On the Simulation of Grid Market Coordination Approaches

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Abstract

Grid computing has recently become an important paradigm for managing computationally demanding applications, composed of a collection of services. The dynamic discovery of services, and the selection of a particular service instance providing the best value out of the discovered alternatives, poses a complex multi-attribute n:m allocation decision problem, which is often solved using a central resource broker. However, decentralized approaches to this service allocation problem represent a much more flexible alternative, thus promising improvements in the efficiency of the resulting negotiations and service allocations. This paper compares centralized and decentralized service allocation mechanisms in Grid market scenarios according to a defined set of metrics.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Information Systems Management, University of Bayreuth, Universitaetsstrasse 30, 95440, Bayreuth, Germany

    Werner Streitberger, Sebastian Hudert & Torsten Eymann

  2. Department of Economics and Business Engineering, University of Karlsruhe, Englerstrasse 14, 76131, Karlsruhe, Germany

    Bjoern Schnizler

  3. IRST – Fondazione Bruno Kessler, via Sommarive 18, 38100, Trento, Italy

    Floriano Zini

  4. Dipartimento di Economia Piazzale, Universita delle merche Ancona, Martelli 8, 60121, Ancona, Italy

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  1. Werner Streitberger
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  2. Sebastian Hudert
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  3. Torsten Eymann
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  4. Bjoern Schnizler
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  5. Floriano Zini
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  6. Michele Catalano
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Correspondence to Werner Streitberger.

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Streitberger, W., Hudert, S., Eymann, T. et al. On the Simulation of Grid Market Coordination Approaches. J Grid Computing 6, 349–366 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10723-007-9092-6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10723-007-9092-6

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