Skip to main content
Log in

Incentive Mechanisms for Cooperative Wireless Networks with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard

  • Published:
International Journal of Wireless Information Networks Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Cooperative communication is a promising technique to improve utilization of the wireless spectrum resource. However, due to the limited wireless network resource, the selfish relay nodes may be unwilling to offer their relay help without any extra incentive. In this work, we study a contract-based mechanism for incentivizing cooperative relay in the presence of the dual asymmetric information. By modelling multi-user cooperative relay as a labour market, a principal-agent model is proposed with the combination of relay power, basic wage and relay bonus in the continuous type scenario. And an optimization problem of multi-user relay incentive is formulated to achieve the twin objectives of ability-discrimination and effort-incentive. Numerical results show that the optimal contract design scheme is effective in improving the performance of cooperative communication.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Fig. 1
Fig. 2
Fig. 3
Fig. 4
Fig. 5
Fig. 6
Fig. 7
Fig. 8

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  1. Nosratinia, A., Hunter, T. E., & Hedayat, A. (2004). Cooperative communication in wireless networks. IEEE Communications Magazine, 42(10), 74–80.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  2. Laneman, J. N., Tse, D. N. C., & Wornell, G. W. (2004). Cooperative diversity in wireless networks: Efficient protocols and outage behavior. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 50(12), 3062–3080.

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  3. Shastry, N., & Adve, R. (2006). Stimulating cooperative diversity in wireless ad hoc networks through pricing. In IEEE International Conference on Communications, IEEE ICC 2006, 2006, pp. 3747–3752.

  4. Astaneh, S. A., & Gazor, S. (2009). Resource allocation and relay selection for collaborative communications. IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, 8(12), 6126–6133.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  5. Hong, X., Wang, J., Wang, C., & Shi, J. (2014). Cognitive radio in 5G: A perspective on energy-spectral efficiency trade-off. IEEE Communications Magazine, 52(7), 46–53.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  6. Zhang, G., Yang, K., Liu, P., & Feng, X. (2013). Incentive mechanism for multiuser cooperative relaying in wireless ad hoc networks: A resource-exchange based approach. Wireless personal communications, 73(3), 697–715.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  7. Duan, L., Gao, L., & Huang, J. (2014). Cooperative spectrum sharing: A contract-based approach. IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, 13(1), 174–187.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  8. Cong, L., Zhao, L., Zhang, H., et al. (2011). Pricing-based game for spectrum allocation in multi-relay cooperative transmission networks. IET Communications, 5(4), 563–573.

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  9. Wang, B., et al. (2009). Distributed relay selection and power control for multiuser cooperative communication networks using Stackelberg game. IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, 8(7), 975–990.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  10. Gao, L., Huang, J., Chen, Y. J., & Shou, B. (2013). An integrated contract and auction design for secondary spectrum sharing. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 31(3), 581–592.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  11. Sheng, S., & Liu, M. (2014). Profit incentive in trading nonexclusive access on a secondary spectrum market through contract design. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 22(4), 1190–1203.

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  12. Zhao, N., Wu, M., Xiong, W., & Liu, C. (2015). Cooperative communication in cognitive radio networks under asymmetric information: A contract-theory based approach. International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks, 2015(676195), 1–11.

    Google Scholar 

  13. Zhao, N., Wu, M., Xiong, W., & Liu, C. (2015). Optimal contract design for cooperative relay incentive mechanism under moral hazard. Journal of Electrical and Computer Engineering, 2015(690807), 1–7.

    Google Scholar 

  14. Bolton, P., & Dewatripont, M. (2005). Contract theory. Cambridge: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  15. Salanié, B. (2005). The economics of contracts: A primer. Cambridge: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  16. Gibbons, R. (2005). Incentives between firms (and within). Management Science, 51(1), 2–17.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  17. Laneman, J. N., & Wornell, G. W. (2003). Distributed space-time-coded protocols for exploiting cooperative diversity in wireless networks. IEEE Transactions on Information theory, 49(10), 2415–2425.

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

This work was supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (Nos. 61501178, 61471162 and 61601177). The author would like to acknowledge the anonymous reviewers whose constructive criticism, comments, and suggestions led to a greatly improved manuscript.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Nan Zhao.

Ethics declarations

Conflict of interest

The authors declare that there is no conflict of interests regarding the publication of this paper.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Zhao, N., Wu, M., Xiong, W. et al. Incentive Mechanisms for Cooperative Wireless Networks with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard. Int J Wireless Inf Networks 23, 273–282 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10776-016-0323-2

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10776-016-0323-2

Keywords

Navigation