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Incentive Mechanism for Rational Miners in Bitcoin Mining Pool

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Abstract

Bitcoin is one of the most popular cryptocurrency in the world. Miners in the Bitcoin network reduce their risks through participating in mining pool. Existing mining pool systems do not consider the cost and strategy of miners. In this paper, we study two mining models: public cost model and private cost model. For the public cost model, we design an incentive mechanism, called Mining game, using a Stackelberg game. We show that Mining game is individually rational, profitable, and has the unique Stackelberg Equilibrium. For the private cost model, we formulate the Budget Feasible Reward Optimization (BFRO) problem to maximize the reward function under the budget constraint, and design a budget feasible reverse auction to solve the BFRO problem, which is computationally efficient, individually rational, truthful, budget feasible, and constant approximate. Through extensive simulations, we evaluate the performance and validate the theoretical properties of our incentive mechanisms.

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Acknowledgements

This research was partly funded by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 61872193).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Jiangsu Key Laboratory of Big Data Security and Intelligent Processing, Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Nanjing, 210023, Jiangsu, China

    Gang Xue, Jia Xu, Hanwen Wu, Weifeng Lu & Lijie Xu

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  1. Gang Xue
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  2. Jia Xu
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  3. Hanwen Wu
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  4. Weifeng Lu
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  5. Lijie Xu
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Correspondence to Jia Xu.

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This is an extended and enhanced version of the paper (Xue et al. 2019) that appeared in the 2nd International Conference on Science of Cyber Security, SciSec2019

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Xue, G., Xu, J., Wu, H. et al. Incentive Mechanism for Rational Miners in Bitcoin Mining Pool. Inf Syst Front 23, 317–327 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10796-020-10019-2

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