Abstract
We can formalize judgments as (consistent sets of) logical formulas. Judgment aggregation deals with judgments of several agents, which need to be aggregated to a collective judgment. There are several logical formalizations of judgment aggregation. This paper focuses on a modal formalization which nicely expresses classical properties of judgment aggregation rules and famous results of social choice theory, like Arrow’s impossibility theorem. A natural deduction system for modal logic of judgment aggregation is presented in this paper. The system is sound and complete. As an example of derivation, a formal proof of Arrow’s impossibility theorem is given.
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Perkov, T. Natural Deduction for Modal Logic of Judgment Aggregation. J of Log Lang and Inf 25, 335–354 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10849-016-9235-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10849-016-9235-x