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Belief Revision and Computational Argumentation: A Critical Comparison

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Abstract

This paper aims at comparing and relating belief revision and argumentation as approaches to model reasoning processes. Referring to some prominent literature references in both fields, we will discuss their (implicit or explicit) assumptions on the modeled processes and hence commonalities and differences in the forms of reasoning they are suitable to deal with. The intended contribution is on one hand assessing the (not fully explored yet) relationships between two lively research fields in the broad area of defeasible reasoning and on the other hand pointing out open issues and potential directions for future research.

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Notes

  1. For the impact of AGM belief revision in the Artificial Intelligence community, see Carnota and Rodríguez (2011).

  2. Here, we are assuming the classical AGM theory (Alchourrón et al. 1985).

  3. For a discussion see also Del Val (1997), Hansson and Olsson (1999).

  4. For details see Makinson (1996), Gärdenfors (2011).

  5. In Belief Change, the postulates that involve minimal change have been the object of controversies. For instance, in contraction, the recovery postulate has been extensively debated (Makinson 1987, 1997a; Hansson 1991, 1999a; Fermé 2001), whereas in the case of revision, the AGM revision operator has been questioned regarding the preservation of minimal change (Rott 2000).

  6. Several different ways for inconsistency-tolerant belief revision can be found in the literature; among them is possible to mention the use of paraconsistent logic instead of classical logic (Priest 2001; Testa et al. 2017, 2018), the use of context sensitivity (Chopra and Parikh 1999; Hansson and Wassermann 2002), and the adoption of belief states (Fermé and Wassermann 2018).

  7. The reader may refer to Baroni and Riveret (2019) for a discussion of the evaluation of statement justification based on argument justification.

  8. The epistemic entrenchment ordering is based on a set of postulates, for the sake of readability we left out the formal details; see Gärdenfors (1988), Gärdenfors and Makinson (1988).

  9. In fact, this approach opens an interesting perspective on a potential interplay between belief change and argument change, which is however out of the main scope of the present article. A discussion on some recent approaches using belief revision notions inside argumentation is provided in Sect. 8.

  10. For example, see Flouris (2006), Flouris et al. (2008).

  11. For an overview of the literature, see (Fermé and Hansson 2018, Section 5.6).

  12. For an overview of the literature, see (Fermé and Hansson 2018, Section 5.5).

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Acknowledgements

We are grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments that helped us improve the original manuscript. E.F. was partially supported by FCT through project UID/CEC/04516/2019 (NOVA LINCS) and projects PTDC/CCI-COM/30990/2017 and PTDC/CCI-COM/4464/2020. G.R.S. has been partially supported by EU H2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie grant agreement No. 690974 for the project MIREL: MIning and Reasoning with Legal texts, by funds provided by Dep. de Ciencias e Ingeniería de la Computación (DCIC), Universidad Nacional del Sur, & Instituto de Ciencias e Ingeniería de la Computación (ICIC UNS-CONICET), Argentina.

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  1. Dip.to di Ingegneria dell’Informazione, Universitá degli Studi di Brescia, Brescia, Italy

    Pietro Baroni & Massimiliano Giacomin

  2. Universidade da Madeira and NOVA-LINCS, Funchal, Portugal

    Eduardo Fermé

  3. Institute for Computer Science and Engineering (CONICET-UNS) and Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Universidad Nacional del Sur, Bahía Blanca, Argentina

    Guillermo Ricardo Simari

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  1. Pietro Baroni
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  2. Eduardo Fermé
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  3. Massimiliano Giacomin
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  4. Guillermo Ricardo Simari
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Correspondence to Guillermo Ricardo Simari.

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Baroni, P., Fermé, E., Giacomin, M. et al. Belief Revision and Computational Argumentation: A Critical Comparison. J of Log Lang and Inf 31, 555–589 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10849-022-09369-8

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