Abstract
We analyze a multiperiod oligopolistic market where each period is a Stackelberg game between a leader firm and multiple follower firms. The leader chooses his production level first, taking into account the reaction of the followers. Then, the follower firms decide their production levels after observing the leader’s decision. The difference between the proposed model and other models discussed in literature is that the leader firm has the power to force the follower firms out of business by preventing them from achieving a target sales level in a given time period. The leader firm has an incentive to lower the market prices possibly lower than the Stackelberg equilibrium in order to push the followers to sell less and eventually go out of business. Intentionally lowering the market prices to force competitors to fail is known as predatory pricing, and is illegal under antitrust laws since it negatively affects consumer welfare. In this work, we show that there exists a predatory pricing strategy where the market price is above the average cost and consumer welfare is preserved. We develop a mixed integer nonlinear problem (MINLP) that models the multiperiod Stackelberg game. The MINLP problem is transformed to a mixed integer linear problem (MILP) by using binary variables and piecewise linearization. A cutting plane algorithm is used to solve the resulting MILP. The results show that firms can engage in predatory pricing even if the average market price is forced to remain higher than the average cost. Furthermore, we show that in order to protect the consumers, antitrust laws can control predatory pricing by setting rules on consumer welfare.
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Naoum-Sawaya, J., Elhedhli, S. Controlled predatory pricing in a multiperiod Stackelberg game: an MPEC approach. J Glob Optim 50, 345–362 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10898-010-9585-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10898-010-9585-x