Abstract
According to the so-called “standard account” regarding the problem of material constitution, a statue and a lump of clay that makes it up are not identical. The usual objection is that this view yields many objects in the same place at the same time. Lynne Rudder Baker's theory of constitution is a recent and sophisticated version of the standard account. She argues that the aforementioned objection can be answered by defining a relation of being the same P as (sameP). In this paper I shall examine consequences of her response and show that sameP has wrong formal properties, as a result of which this solution cannot be accepted.
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Kakol, T. The SameP-Relation as a Response to Critics of Baker's Theory of Constitution. J Philos Logic 34, 561–579 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-005-1525-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-005-1525-8