Skip to main content
Springer Nature Link
Log in

Possible Worlds Semantics and Fiction

  • Published:
Journal of Philosophical Logic Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

The canonical version of possible worlds semantics for story prefixes is due to David Lewis. This paper reassesses Lewis's theory and draws attention to some novel problems for his account.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Subscribe and save

Springer+ Basic
$34.99 /Month
  • Get 10 units per month
  • Download Article/Chapter or eBook
  • 1 Unit = 1 Article or 1 Chapter
  • Cancel anytime
Subscribe now

Buy Now

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Anscombe, G. E. M. (1958): Pretending, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 32, pp. 279–294.

  • Baldwin, T. (1998): Modal fictionalism and the imagination, Analysis 58(2), 72–75.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Braun, D. (1993): Empty names, Noûs 27(4), 449–469.

  • Brock, S. (1993): Modal fictionalism: A response to Rosen, Mind 102, 147–150.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Byrne, A. (1993): Truth in fiction: The story continued, Australas. J. Philos. 71(1), 24–35.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cresswell, M. J. (1973): Logics and Languages, Methuen, London.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cresswell, M. J. (1988): Semantics Essays: Possible Worlds and Their Rivals, Kluwer, Dordrecht.

    Google Scholar 

  • Crittenden, C. (1982): Fictional characters and logical completeness, Poetics 11, 331–344.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Crossley, J. N. and Humberstone, L. (1977): The logic of ‘actually,’ Rep. Math. Log. 8, 11–29.

    Google Scholar 

  • Currie, G. (1990): The Nature of Fiction, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Currie, G. and Ravenscroft, I. (1997): Mental simulation and motor imagery, Philos. Sci. 64, 160–180.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Divers, J. (1995): Modal fictionalism cannot deliver possible worlds semantics, Analysis 55(2), 81–88.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Divers, J. (1999), A modal fictionalist result, Noûs 33(3), 317–346.

    Google Scholar 

  • Donnellan, K. (1977): Speaking of nothing, in S. P. Schwartz (ed.), Naming, Necessity and Natural Kinds, Cornell University Press, Ithaca.

    Google Scholar 

  • Evans, G. (1982): The Varieties of Reference, Clarendon, Oxford.

    Google Scholar 

  • Herschel, J. F. W. (1851): A Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy, Longmans & Co., London.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hale (1995a): Modal fictionalism – a simple dilemma, Analysis 55(2), 63–67.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hale (1995b): A desperate fix, Analysis 55(2), 74–81.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hughes, G. E. and Cresswell, M. J. (1972): An Introduction to Modal Logic, Methuen & Co., London.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kaplan, D. (1973): Bob and Carol and Ted and Alice, in J. Hintikka et al. (eds.), Approaches to Natural Language, D. Reider, Dordrecht, pp. 490–517.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kripke, S. (1973): Shearman Lectures delivered at University College London.

  • Kripke, S. (1980): Naming and Necessity, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.

    Google Scholar 

  • Le Poidevin, R. (1988): Time and truth in fiction, Br. J. Aesthet. 28(3), 248–258.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D. (1976): The paradoxes of time travel, Am. Philos. Q. 13(2), 145–152.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D. (1983): Truth in fiction, in D. Lewis, Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1, Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 261–280.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D. (1988): Relevant implication, Theoria 54, 162–174.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D. (1992): Critical notice of D. M Armstrong, A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility, Australas. J. Philos. 70(2), 211–224.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Linsky, B. and Zalta, E. N. (1991): Is Lewis a Meinongian? Australas. J. Philos. 69(4), 438–453.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lukasiewicz, J. (1970a): On three-valued logic, in L. Borkowski (ed.), Jan Lukasiewicz: Selected Works, North Holland, Amsterdam.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lukasiewicz, J. (1970b): Philosophical remarks on many-valued systems, in L. Borkowski (ed.), Jan Lukasiewicz: Selected Works, North Holland, Amsterdam.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nolan, D. (1997): Three problems for ‘strong’ modal fictionalism, Philos. Stud. 87(3), 259–275.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Noonan, H. W. (1994): In defence of the letter of fictionalism, Analysis 54(3), 133–139.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Parsons, T. (1995): Meinongian semantics generalized, Grazer Philos. Stud. 50, 145–161.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rapaport, W. J. (1991): Predication, fiction, and artificial intelligence, Topoi 10, 79–111.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rescher, N. and Brandom, R. (1979): The Logic of Inconsistency: A Study in Non-Standard Possible-World Semantics and Ontology, Rowman and Littlefield, Totowa, NJ.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rosen, G. (1990): Modal fictionalism, Mind 99, 327–354.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rosen, G. (1993): A problem for fictionalism about possible worlds, Analysis 53(2), 71–81.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rosen, G. (1995): Modal fictionalism fixed, Analysis 55(2), 67–73.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Routley, R. (1980): Exploring Meinong's Jungle, Monograph No. 3, Department of Philosophy, Australian National University.

  • Routley, R. and Routley, V. (1972): The semantics of first degree entailment, Noûs 72(6), 335–359.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Salmon, N. (1989): The logic of what might have been, Philos. Rev. 98(1), 3–35.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Salmon, N. (1998): Nonexistence, Noûs 32(3), 277–319.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schiffer, S. (1996): Language-created language-independent entities, Philos. Top. 24(1), 149–167.

    Google Scholar 

  • Searle, J. (1979): The logical status of fictional discourse, in J. Searle, Expression and Meaning, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 58–75.

    Google Scholar 

  • Van Inwagen, P. (1983): Fiction and existence, Philos. Lit. 7, 67–77.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vision, G. (1993): Fiction and fictionalist reductions, Pac. Philos. Q. 74, 150–174.

    Google Scholar 

  • Walton, K. L. (1990): Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Walton, K. L. (1997): Spelunking, simulation and slime, in M. Hjort and S. Laver (eds.), Emotion and the Arts, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wolterstorff, N. (1980): Works and Worlds of Art, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zadeh, L. A. (1965): Fuzzy sets, Inf. Control 8, 338–353.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zadeh, L. A. (1975): Fuzzy logic and approximate reasoning, Synthese 30, 407–428.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zalta, E. N. (1995): Two (related) world views, Noûs 29(2), 189–211.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Philosophy Department, University of Canterbury, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch, New Zealand

    Diane Proudfoot

Authors
  1. Diane Proudfoot
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author inPubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Diane Proudfoot.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Proudfoot, D. Possible Worlds Semantics and Fiction. J Philos Logic 35, 9–40 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-005-9005-8

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-005-9005-8

Key words