Abstract
Various proposals have suggested that an adequate explanatory theory should reduce the number or the cardinality of the set of logically independent claims that need be accepted in order to entail a body of data. A (and perhaps the only) well-formed proposal of this kind is William Kneale’s: an explanatory theory should be finitely axiomatizable but it’s set of logical consequences in the data language should not be finitely axiomatizable. Craig and Vaught showed that Kneale theories (almost) always exist for any recursively enumerable but not finitely axiomatizable set of data sentences in a first order language with identity. Kneale’s criterion underdetermines explanation even given all possible data in the data language; gratuitous axioms may be “tacked on.” Define a Kneale theory, T, to be logically minimal if it is deducible from every Kneale theory (in the vocabulary of T) that entails the same statements in the data language as does T. If they exist, minimal Kneale theories are candidates for best explanations: they are “bold” in a sense close to Popper’s; some minimal Kneale theory is true if any Kneale theory is true; the minimal Kneale theory that is data equivalent to any given Kneale theory is unique; and no Kneale theory is more probable than some minimal Kneale theory. I show that under the Craig-Vaught conditions, no minimal Kneale theories exist.
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Glymour, C. On the Possibility of Inference to the Best Explanation. J Philos Logic 41, 461–469 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-011-9179-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-011-9179-1