Abstract
In this paper, I argue for three claims. The first is that the difference between analog and digital representation lies in the format and not the medium of representation. The second is that whether a given system is analog or digital will sometimes depend on facts about the user of that system. The third is that the first two claims are implicit in Haugeland's (1998) account of the distinction.
Similar content being viewed by others
Explore related subjects
Discover the latest articles, news and stories from top researchers in related subjects.Notes
These capacities are present early in infancy, and remain present in older children and adults, long after the acquisition of precise numerical capacities. Moreover, approximate numerical capacities similar to those observed in humans have been documented in a range of other species.
References
Dehaene, S. (1997). The number sense. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gallistel, C. R., Gelman, R., & Cordes, S. (2006). The cultural and evolutionary history of the real numbers. In S. Levinson & P. Jaisson (Eds.), Culture and evolution. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Goodman, N. (1968). Languages of art. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc.
Haugeland, J. (1998). Analog and analog. In J. Haugeland (Ed.), Having thought. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Hauser, M. D., & Spelke, E. S. (2004). Evolutionary and developmental foundations of human knowledge: A case study of mathematics. In M. Gazzaniga (Ed.), The cognitive neurosciences (Vol. 3). Cambridge: MIT Press.
Laurence, S., & Margolis, E. (2005). Number and natural language. In P. Carruthers, S. Laurence, & S. Stich (Eds.), The innate mind: Structure and content (pp. 216–235). New York: Oxford University Press.
Lewis, D. (1971). Analog and digital. Nous, 5(3), 321–327.
Spelke, E. S. (2003). What makes us smart? Core knowledge and natural language. In D. Gentner & S. Goldin-Meadow (Eds.), Language in mind: Advances in the investigation of language and thought. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Von Neumann, J. (1958/2000). The computer and the brain (2nd ed.). New Haven: Yale University Press.
Wynn, K. (1992). Evidence against empiricist accounts of the origins of numerical knowledge. In A. I. Goldman (Ed.), Readings in philosophy and cognitive science (pp. 209–227). Cambridge: MIT Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Katz, M. Analog and Digital Representation. Minds & Machines 18, 403–408 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-008-9112-8
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-008-9112-8