Abstract
The novelty of quantum cryptography is that whenever a spy tries to eavesdrop the communication he causes disturbances in the transmission of the message. Ultimately this unavoidable disturbance is a consequence of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle that limits the joint knowledge of complementary observables. We present in this paper a novel and highly speculative approach. We propose to replace Heisenberg uncertainties by another type of uncertainty, that characterizes the knowledge of the time at which an unstable nucleus decays. Previously developed protocols of quantum cryptography make it possible to refresh a key even in the case that we do not trust the carrier of the key. This scheme might do so as well.
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This is what is commonly called an intercept resend strategy.
As is well known, confidentiality is then absolute provided the length of the key equals the length of the message to transmit.
The transmutation channel is not interesting for cryptographic purposes because it is possible experimentally to differentiate different isotopes of a same element by measuring isotopic displacements of their spectral rays. This has been measured for instance for the \(Pb\) element (Wasowicz and Kwela 2008). In parallel, an accurate theoretical description of the phenomenon has been achieved for instance in the case of light elements for which mass effects are dominant (Godefroid et al. 2001).
We are currently investigating experimental limitations on the detection accuracy inherent to our protocol. This study is still in a preliminary phase and it is out of the scope of the present paper to describe the experimental aspects of our encryption scheme.
By doing so, Alice could observe and memorize which are the pairs of cells in which only one cell contains the isotope that we use for encryption, which would occur with probability of the order of \(2\cdot \mu \cdot (1-\mu )\). Afterwards, by listening to Alice-Bob communication she could guess a fraction of the order of \({ \mu \cdot (1-\mu )\over \mu }\) of the bits effectively measured by Bob, more or less, when \(\mu \approx 10 \), \(90\,\%\) of them! When all cells are impregnated with low dilution placebo solution, there is a large number of non-excited nuclei in each cell so that their counting, cell by cell, is deprived of information that could appear to be useful for Eve.
Actually in this case, Eve ought also to replace an equivalent fraction of Bob’s bits by neutral bits in order to mask her intervention. This means, strictly speaking, that instead of knowing a fraction \(P\) of Bob’s bits, Eve knows a fraction \({P\over 1-P}\) of them. Now, \({P\over 1-P}\approx P+P^2\) when \(P\) is a small parameter, and this is a second order effect that we shall consistently neglect in the following.
We were informed (private communication) after we put a paper relative to our protocol on the arxives that in principle an eavesdropper could weight the atoms used for encryption in order to differentiate the excited ones from the non-excited ones. Of course this requires to be able to isolate the isotopes and to weight all of them individually with a precision higher than the excitation energy divided by \(c^2\). We consider that such an attack is impossible FAPP.
We developed in the past (Durt 2002) a protocol for key encryption for which the security is guaranteed by the imperfection of available sources and detectors. In that case too, we assumed that the ability of Eve to control/produce and/or detect single photons was per se limited.
Funnily, when we realize the BB84 protocol with long lived quantum states we are getting close to Wiesner’s original idea, that can be traced back to the prehistory of quantum cryptography (Brassard 2006), according to which one could create uncounterfeitable banknotes by numbering them thanks to quantum bits. It is not taken for granted however that bankers and postmen would accept to manipulate radioactive paper...
It is also worth mentioning that a proposed unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment via parity violations has been proposed recently by C-Y Cheung (2009), that also exploits the properties of unstable quantum systems.
The halflife \(T _{1/2}\) equals \(| ln 2|\) times the mean life time \(\tau _D\).
A thick target is such that all incomings protons are absorbed. It can be obtained with a metal plate of thickness of 1 millimeter. One Megabecquerel per micro Ampere hour means that when \({10^{-6}\cdot 3600\over 1,6\cdot 10^{-19}}\) protons hit the target, a rate of \(10^6\) desintegrations per second is generated. This corresponds to a number of metastable nuclei of the order of \(10^6\cdot 13,6\cdot 24\cdot 3600 \cdot {1\over ln 2 }\). So in a time of the order of an half-hour, of the order of \(10^{12}\) radioactive bits could be in principle produced.
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T.D. acknowledges support from the ICT Impulse Program of the Brussels Capital Region (Project Cryptasc).
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Appendix: Production of a metastable Sn isotope of halflife 13.6 days
Appendix: Production of a metastable Sn isotope of halflife 13.6 days
By bombarding natural Sn (composed of nine stable isotopes with mass between 112 and 124) with high energy protons, many radioactive nuclides of the elements Sb, Sn, In and Cd with half lives longer than 1 min can be formed (for instance more than 50 when the energy of the protons is 65 Mev (Hermanne et al. 2006)). Excitation functions, expressing the probability of the production in function of the particle energy, for 13 among them, all emitting \(\gamma \)-rays with energy above 100 keV, are documented in Ref. (Hermanne et al. 2006). One of these radionuclides is the metastable state \(^{117{\rm m}}{\rm Sn}\) of the stable, naturally occurring, isotope 117Sn. The decay is characterized by a halflife \(T _{1/2} = 13.6\) daysFootnote 12 and the deexcitation from the metastable state to the ground state occurs through a cascade emission of a 156.0 keV \(\gamma \)-ray to an intermediate excited level followed by a 158.56keV \(\gamma \)-ray.
These transitions are characterized by high internal conversion rates which mean that the energy of the \(\gamma \)-rays is converted to electronic excitation states with high probability, which in turn induces several X-lines with energies between 25 and 29 keV.
The shape of the excitation function suggests that only a small fraction of the metastable state is formed by inelastic (p,p) scattering on 117Sn while the largest part is due to (p,pxn) reactions on 118,119,120 Sn. The contribution of decay of 117Sb (only 0.07 \(\%\) decays to 117\(^{\rm m}Sn\)) can be neglected. For incident protons of 30MeV (a standard value for commercially available isotope production machines) a thick target yield of 1MBq/\(\mu \)Ah can be expected.Footnote 13
Contaminating radio- or stable nuclides of Sb and In can be removed by a standard chemical separation step shortly after the end of bombardment. The production of the possibly disturbing co-produced Sn isotopes 113Sn (\(T _{1/2}\,= \,115.1\) days); 119mSn (\(T _{1/2}\,= \,293\) days), 121\(^m\)Sn (\(T _{1/2}\,=\, 50\) years) and 123Sn (\(T _{1/2}\,= \,129.2\) days) can be limited or avoided by working with enriched 118Sn targets. Moreover, isotopes with a long lifetime would be present in the placebo substance (Sect. 2, ii) in comparable proportions. Finally, it has to be remarked that for 117\(^{\rm m}\)Sn production an alternative to charged particle activation is (n,\(\gamma \)) caption in a fission reactor on enriched 116Sn targets.
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Durt, T., Hermanne, A. Cryptographic encryption scheme based on metastable excited nuclei. Nat Comput 13, 487–495 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11047-014-9455-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11047-014-9455-4