Abstract
We apply Li et al.’s “minimal” quantization rules (Phys. Lett. A 306, 73, 2002) to investigate the quantum version of the Stackelberg–Bertrand duopoly, especially how the quantum entanglement affects the second-mover advantage in the Stackelberg–Bertrand duopoly. It is found that positive quantum entanglement is more favourable to the profit of the leader and destroys the second-mover advantage.
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Notes
In order to extend the classical Cournot duopoly to the quantum domain, Li et al. make use of two single mode electromagnetic fields [6]. The reason for choosing such fields is that they have a continuous set of eigenstates. The quantization scheme requires the Hilbert space used in the quantum game to have at least the same number of distinguishable states as that of the different classical strategies. As the strategic space of the classical Cournot game is a continuum, a Hilbert space with a continuous set of orthogonal bases is required. This “minimal” quantization scheme only extends the initial state to be an entangled state while keeping the strategic space unexpanded. Accordingly, the quantum game returns to the original classical game in the absence of entanglement.
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Appendix
Appendix
To derive the Nash equilibrium shown in Eqs. (5) and (6) from Eqs. (3) and (4), we first determine the reaction function of the follower who is supposed to react optimally to the price chosen by the leader and maximizes his or her profit. This can be achieved by requiring
Here, \({\overline{p}}_{F}\) is the reaction function of the follower. For different values of \(p_{L}\), the follower will optimize his or her profit with the price \({\overline{p}}_{F}\). Subsequently, against the optimal response of the follower, the leader maximizes his or her profit as follows:
Substituting \(p_{L}^{*}\) into Eq. (A.1), we obtain
With these optimal prices their profits are then given by Eqs. (7) and (8). Moreover, their counterparts in the quantized game shown in Eqs. (18)–(21) can be derived in a similar manner.
Finally, to obtain the asymptotic limits in Eqs. (22)–(25), one can first rewrite the expressions in Eqs. (20) and (21) in terms of \(\tanh \gamma \), and then apply the limit \(\tanh \gamma \longrightarrow \pm 1\) as \(\gamma \longrightarrow \pm \infty \).
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Lo, C.F., Yeung, C.F. Quantum Stackelberg–Bertrand duopoly. Quantum Inf Process 19, 373 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11128-020-02886-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11128-020-02886-0