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The Smith-Walley Interpretation of Subjective Probability: An Appreciation

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Abstract

The right interpretation of subjective probability is implicit in the theories of upper and lower odds, and upper and lower previsions, developed, respectively, by Cedric Smith (1961) and Peter Walley (1991). On this interpretation you are free to assign contingent events the probability 1 (and thus to employ conditionalization as a method of probability revision) without becoming vulnerable to a weak Dutch book.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Mathematics, The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN, 37996-1300, U.S.A

    Carl G. Wagner

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  1. Carl G. Wagner
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Correspondence to Carl G. Wagner.

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Special Issue Formal Epistemology I. Edited by Branden Fitelson

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Wagner, C.G. The Smith-Walley Interpretation of Subjective Probability: An Appreciation. Stud Logica 86, 343–350 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-007-9064-7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-007-9064-7

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