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What is a Truth Value And How Many Are There?

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Abstract

Truth values are, properly understood, merely proxies for the various relations that can hold between language and the world. Once truth values are understood in this way, consideration of the Liar paradox and the revenge problem shows that our language is indefinitely extensible, as is the class of truth values that statements of our language can take – in short, there is a proper class of such truth values. As a result, important and unexpected connections emerge between the semantic paradoxes and the set-theoretic paradoxes.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Minnesota, 819 Heller Hall 271 19th Ave, Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA

    Roy T. Cook

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  1. Roy T. Cook
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Correspondence to Roy T. Cook.

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Cook, R.T. What is a Truth Value And How Many Are There?. Stud Logica 92, 183–201 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-009-9194-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-009-9194-1

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