Abstract
The aim of this paper is to provide epistemic reasons for investigating the notions of informal rigour and informal provability. I argue that the standard view of mathematical proof and rigour yields an implausible account of mathematical knowledge, and falls short of explaining the success of mathematical practice. I conclude that careful consideration of mathematical practice urges us to pursue a theory of informal provability.
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Antonutti Marfori, M. Informal Proofs and Mathematical Rigour. Stud Logica 96, 261–272 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-010-9280-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-010-9280-4