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Provably secure post-quantum authenticated key exchange from supersingular isogenies

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Abstract

Supersingular isogeny-based cryptography is now seen as one of the most promising candidates that can be secure against the upcoming quantum computer attacks. This article aims to present a provably secure post-quantum authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol from supersingular isogenies under the extended Canetti–Krawczyk (eCK) security model, and provide an alternative for protecting communications over open channels from being attacked in the near future post-quantum era. Thus, the expected post-quantum AKE protocol from supersingular isogenies is presented in this article using the well-known SIDH and SIKE as its building blocks. The new post-quantum AKE protocol is formally proved secure under the strong eCK security model, which actually can also be formally proved secure in the \(\text {CK}^{+}\) security model. In addition, the relatively time-consuming encapsulation algorithm can be performed in advance in the new AKE protocol, so in practice, the new AKE protocol may gain efficiency advantage over some existing AKE protocols from supersingular isogenies. So, considering the overall security and computation efficiency, it can be said that the presented post-quantum AKE protocol may be a good choice in the upcoming post-quantum era.

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Acknowledgements

The authors would like to sincerely gratitude to the editor and anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and work for this paper. This work was supported in part by the Natural Science Basic Research Program of Shaanxi Province of China under Grant 2021JQ-123, in part by National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 62074131), and in part by the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (No. 31020200QD011).

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  1. School of Cybersecurity, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi’an, 710072, People’s Republic of China

    Mingping Qi

  2. School of Mathematics and Statistics, Wuhan University, Wuhan, 430072, People’s Republic of China

    Jianhua Chen

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  1. Mingping Qi
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Correspondence to Mingping Qi.

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Qi, M., Chen, J. Provably secure post-quantum authenticated key exchange from supersingular isogenies. J Supercomput 78, 12815–12833 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11227-022-04378-7

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